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Reinventing the Wheel: Constructing Ethical Approaches to
State Indigent Legal Defense Systems
Abstract. Indigent defense remains in a state of crisis. Almost fifty years
after the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Gideon v. Wainwright,
lack of funding, favoritism, inefficiency, and poorly-designed indigent-
defense plans plague the system, which can best be characterized as being
in a state of disrepair. As a result, accused indigent individuals, a
vulnerable population, suffer from a lack of adequate representation. This
Article reviews the history and implementation of various indigent-defense
systems and examines the ethical issues arising from their operation. It
offers a guide to reconstructing a model system, including the suggestion
that attorneys first recommit the profession to service. The Article then
examines how one of the most successful programs in the country, the San
Mateo (California) Private Defender Program, could be implemented by
having local governments contract with bar associations to provide
indigent defense.
Author. Dean (1998-2007) and Professor of Law (1998-Present), St.
Mary's University School of Law, San Antonio, Texas; Chair of the Bexar
County (Texas) Task Force on Indigent Defense from December 2010 to
May 2011. A copy of the final report of the Bexar County Task Force is
available at http://www.bexar.org/Indigent/FinalReport2011.pdf. I am
indebted to my research assistant, Rachel Ambler, and to my secretary,
Maria Vega, for their assistance.
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"Virtually all difficult ethical problems arise from conflict between a
lawyer's responsibilities ... and . . . the lawyer's own interest in
remaining an ethical person while earning a satisfactory living."'
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court's 1963 decision in Gideon v.
Wainwright' guarantees individual criminal defendants, under the United
States Constitution, the right to counsel at government expense.3  As a
result of the Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona,' defendants are
informed of this right at the time of interrogation.5 The general public is
well aware of Miranda's protections due to the frequent reading of these
rights in the media6  and their extensive incorporation in the
criminal-justice system.7  Eighty-eight percent of Americans believe that
the government will appoint an attorney to indigent individuals charged
with a crime," though they are uncertain who provides the legal
representation and who pays the legal expenses.9 The public may also be
unaware of something that has become obvious to the American Bar
Association (ABA) and many others within the indigent-defense system:
This system doesn't work very well.1 o Forty years later, Gideon's potential
1. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 9 (2002).
2. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
3. Id. at 339-40 ("We have construed [the Sixth Amendment] to mean that in federal courts
counsel must be provided for defendants unable to employ counsel unless the right is competently
and intelligently waived.").
4. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
5. Id. at 473.
6. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) ("Miranda has become embedded in
routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become part of our national culture.").
In Miranda, the Court specifically articulated that "[p]rior to any questioning, the person must be
warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence
against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed."
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
7. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 304 (1980) (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("The meaning
of Miranda has become reasonably clear and law enforcement practices have adjusted to its
strictures. . . .").
8. BELDEN RUSSONELLO & STEWART, OPEN SOC'Y INST. & NAT'L LEGAL AID &
DEFENDER ASS'N, DEVELOPING A NATIONAL MESSAGE FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE: ANALYSIS OF
NATIONAL SURVEY 1, 4 (2001), available at http://www.nlada.org/DMS/Documents/1211996548.
53/Polling%20results%20report.pdf (studying public opinions about "due process and the role of
lawyers who represent indigent criminal defendants"). The research included a survey of 1,500
American adults in addition to eight focus groups. Id. at 2.
9. Id. at 16 (indicating that 28% of survey participants were unsure of whether the state
provided the attorney in a public-defender system).
10. See Note, Effectively Ineffective: The Failure of Courts to Address Underfunded Indigent
Defense Systerns, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1735 (2005) (noting an estimated 40% increase in
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influence has been characterized as a broken promise." Attorney General
Eric Holder recently characterized our indigent-defense system as a
"crisis." 1 2  The magnitude of the crisis is staggering because an estimated
60%-90% of criminal defendants are indigent.1 3  Attorney General
Holder indicated that reforming the system is a "top priority for the
[Obama] Administration." 14
In many instances, state indigent-defense systems' appointment
processes appear rife with favoritism, accompanied by the prevalence of
incompetent and corrupt representation of individuals. 1 5  Furthermore,
indigent caseloads, thereby indicating that a tremendous number of defendants stand to lose or gain
from the effectiveness of appointed counsel).
11. See generally STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, AM. BAR
ASS'N, GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA'S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 1
(2004), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abaladministrative/legal-aid-
indigentdefendants/Is sclaid def bp-right-to counselincriminal-proceedings.authcheckdam.pdf
(recommending indigent-defense reforms to combat the finding that the equal justice implied in
Gideon remains an unfulfilled promise).
12. Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att'y Gen., Remarks at Department of Justice National Symposium on
Indigent Defense: Looking Back, Looking Forward, 2000-2010 (Feb. 18, 2010) (transcript available
at http://www.justice.gov/ag/speeches/2010/ag-speech-100218.html); accord EVE BRENSIKE PRIMUS,
AM. CONSTITUTION SOC'Y FOR LAW & POLICY, LITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR DEALING WITH
THE INDIGENT DEFENSE CRISIS 12 (2010), available at http://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/
Primus_- _LitigationStrategies.pdf (affirming that "the indigent[-]defense crisis has reached such
epidemic proportions that the federal executive and legislative branches are now willing to
intervene").
13. THE SPANGENBERG GRP., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 181160, CONTRACTING FOR
INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES: A SPECIAL REPORT 3 n. 1 (2000), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles1/bja/181160.pdf.
14. CARA H. DRINAN, AM. CONSTITUTION SOC'Y FOR LAW & POLICY, A LEGISLATIVE
APPROACH TO INDIGENT DEFENSE REFORM 1 (2010), available at http://www.acslaw.org
/sites/default/files/ACS%201ssue%20Brief/o20-%20Drinan%20ndigent%20Def%/20Reform_0.pdf.
15. Compare Brian Chasnoff, Being a Favorite ofJudges Pays, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS,
Nov. 6, 2010, http://www.mysanantonio.com/news/local-news/article/being-a-favorite-of-judges-
pays-801940.php ("A state task force pointed out the noncompliance [with the Fair Defense Act of
2001] two months ago in a review requested by a local senator[,] ... conclud[ing] that too many
cases were going to too few attorneys."), and Brian Chasnoff, Review Sees Apparent Violations in Bexar
Courts, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Oct. 13, 2010, http://www.mysanantonio.com/default/
article/Review-sees-apparent-violations-in-Bexar-courts-704717.php (quoting an anonymous
respondent's 2009 statement to the Texas Task Force on Indigent Defense that "[a] few lawyers are
receiving an inordinate number of appointments" (internal quotation marks omitted)), with Laura A.
Bischoff, Some Lauyers Suspect Favoritism in Juvenile Court Appointments, DAYTON DAILY NEWS,
Mar. 6, 2010, http://www.daytondailynews.com/news/dayton-news/some-lawyers-suspect-favoritism-
in-juvenile-court-appointments-584321.html ("[Tihe distribution of the cases show that the [wheel]
system is not being strictly followed, and some attorneys wonder whether favoritism plays a role in
who gets the work."), and Brian Collister, Top Court Appointed Attorneys Rake in Big Bucks, WOAI,
http://www.woai.com/content/troubleshooters/story/Top-court-appointed-attorneys-rake-in-big-
bucks/b8RbHpH5d0OoeonwVsL5rw.cspx (last updated Nov. 8, 2010) ("The data shows that [a
judge] hands most of her court appointments . . . to her political supporters and friends."). But see
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the rising cost of indigent defense" alarms government entities and
taxpayers funding these programs. 1 7 This Article will examine the history,
strengths, and weaknesses of the various mechanisms employed by state
and local governments to provide indigent representation. It will also
explore significant innovations and alternatives. Finally, this Article will
demonstrate how individual attorneys, bar associations, and judges should
comply with their ethical obligations in order to affirmatively address these
concerns.
II. HISTORY OF THE RIGHT TO COURT-APPOINTED COUNSEL
A. Constitutional Foundation
The unamended United States Constitution did not contain any
provisions guaranteeing the right to counsel, let alone the right to
Robert I. Kahn, Free Criminal Attorney in San Antonio, LAW OFF. OF ROBERT I. KAHN (Dec. 10,
2010), http://www.kahndefense.com/blog/2010/12/10/ ("Bexar task force to examine indigent
defense because a small group of attorneys are receiving [a] large portion of clients. There ha[ve] to
be more serious issues facing the Bexar County Courts[;] I personally see the same dedicated
attorneys day after day appearing in court waiting for a case to be assigned to them. Should we fault
them or should we fault the clerk for assigning cases to the attorneys that show up? No [w]ay! I've
personally seen Pat, clerk of Bexar County [Clourt 9 assign the cases in alphabetical order to the
attorneys in the same order as they appeared in court. Is this favoritism by the court, or is this
attorney[] making our court system move quick and respond to those in need?").
16. Bill Piatt, County Needs More Efficient Indigent Defense System, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-
NEWS, June 1, 2011, http://www.mysanantonio.com/opinion/commentary/article/County-needs-
more-efficient-indigent-defense-1403588.php; accord HOLLY R. STEVENS ET AL., STANDING
COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, STATE, AM. BAR ASS'N, COUNTY AND LOCAL
EXPENDITURES FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES FISCAL YEAR 2008 6-7 (2010), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal-aid-indigent-defendants/Is-sclai
d-def expenditures-fy08.authcheckdam.pdf (demonstrating that state expenditures on indigent
defense rose dramatically over the years: $991 million in 1986, $3.3 billion in 2002, $4.1 billion in
2005, and approximately $5.3 billion in 2008).
17. Phyllis E. Mann, Lawmakers Across Country Examine the Costs of Indigent Defense, NAT'L
LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N JUSTICE STANDARDS, EVALUATION, & RESEARCH INITIATIVE
(May 9, 2011, 12:42 PM), http://www.nlada.net/jseriblog/lawmakers-across-country-examine-costs-
indigent-defense ("Financial times are bad all over, and policymakers are taking a closer look at what
tax dollars are purchasing in the states' indigent defense systems."); see, e.g., Jeremy Roebuck & Jared
Janes, Expense of Defense: Costly Indigent Defense Program Burdened by Inefficiencies, THE MONITOR
(Dec. 19, 2009, 9:59 PM), http://www.themonitor.comlarticles/defense-33723-expense-burdened.
html (indicating that Hidalgo County, located in South Texas, spent $8.6 million on indigent
defense in 2009). See generally HOLLY R. STEVENS ET AL., STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID &
INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, AM. BAR Ass'N, STATE, COUNTY AND LOCAL EXPENDITURES FOR
INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES FISCAL YEAR 2008 6-7 (2010), available at http://www.americanbar.
org/content/dam/abaladministrativellegal-aid-indigent-defendants/ssclaid del expenditures-fy08.
authcheckdam.pdf (detailing the increasing expenditures of each state's indigent-defense programs
because the systems are woefully underfunded and in a state of crisis).
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government-provided counsel."s However, several of the colonies had
long recognized these rights.' 9 Because the Framers did not provide a
right to counsel, states offered constitutional amendments for such as part
of their ratifying process.2 0 A list of the states and their proposals include:
* At the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, the anti- federalist minority
proposed "[t]hat in all capital and criminal prosecutions, a man has a right
to . .. be heard by himself and his counsel." 2 1
* The Maryland ratifying convention sent "Proposed Amendments" with
their ratification, which included the suggestion that "in all criminal
prosecutions every man hath a right ... to be allowed council." 2 2
* The Virginia ratifying convention offered a proposal "[t]hat in all criminal
and capital prosecutions, a man hath a right to .. . be allowed counsel in his
favor." 2 3
* At the New York ratifying convention, where the vote for ratification was
one of the hardest fought, the delegates resolved to ratify with the proposal
"that in all Criminal Prosecutions, the Accused ought to [have] . . . the
18. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I-VII (establishing a framework for the United States'
governing principles).
19. THE MASSACHUSETTS BODY OF LIBERTIES (1641), reprinted in THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC: PRIMARY SOURCES 15, 17 (Bruce Frohnen ed., 2002) ("Every man that findeth himselfe
unfit to plead his owne cause in any Court, shall have Libertie to imploy any man against whom the
Court doth not except, to helpe him, Provided he give him noe fee, or reward for his paines."); see
JAMES J. TOMKOVICz, THE RIGHT TO THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 13 (2002) (tracing Pennsylvania's and Delaware's 1718-1719
state-appointed counsel provisions for indigents in capital trials; South Carolina's 1731 statutory
provision for up to two court-appointed attorneys upon request; and New Hampshire's 1791 law
providing court-appointed counsel in all capital crimes); HUGH RICHARD WILLIAMS, THE HISTORY
OF THE RIGHT TO FREE COUNSEL IN AMERICA 7, 9 (rev. ed. 2004), available at http://pol.
illinoisstate.edu/downloads/icspspapers/2004/williamsl23.pdf (declaring that Connecticut began
offering court-appointed indigent defense in 1750, with South Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
and Delaware subsequently following suit).
20. See, e.g., IN CONVENTION OF THE DELEGATES OF THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF
MARYLAND (1788), reprinted in THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION: FEDERALIST AND
ANTIFEDERALIST SPEECHES, ARTICLES, AND LETTERS DURING THE STRUGGLE OVER
RATIFICATION, PART TWO 552, 554 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 6th ed. 1992) (proposing amendments
that included a right to counsel).
21. ADDRESS OF THE MINORITY OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CONVENTION (1787), reprinted in
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: PRIMARY SOURCES 268, 271 (Bruce Frohnen ed., 2002).
22. IN CONVENTION OF THE DELEGATES OF THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MARYLAND
(1788), reprinted in THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION: FEDERALIST AND ANTIFEDERALIST
SPEECHES, ARTICLES, AND LETTERS DURING THE STRUGGLE OVER RATIFICATION, PART TWO
552, 554 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 6th ed. 1992).
23. VIRGINIA RATIFYING CONVENTION (1788), reprinted in FOUNDING AMERICA:
DOCUMENTS FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE BILL OF RIGHTS 594, 594-95 (Jack N. Rakove ed.,
2006).
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assistance of Council for his defense." 24
# On the same day as the New York ratifying convention, the North
Carolina ratifying convention offered its declaration that "in all capital and
criminal prosecutions, a man hath a right to . .. be allowed counsel in his
favor."2 5
When the First Congress under the Constitution met, it immediately set
to work designing what became known as the Bill of Rights. 2 6 In a speech
to Congress, James Madison expressed: "The amendments which have
occurred to me, proper to be recommended by Congress to the State
Legislatures, are[:] ... In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall... have the assistance of counsel for his defen[s]e." 2 7  Ultimately,
the House of Representatives proposed "Article the Ninth," which stated
that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . .. to
have the assistance of counsel for his defen[s]e." 2" The language of Article
the Ninth was delivered to the states on September 25, 1789, as "Article
the Eighth," for consideration as an amendment to the Constitution.
Article the Eighth was ratified and became the Sixth Amendment.30
24. NEW YORK RATIFYING CONVENTION (1788), reprinted in FOUNDING AMERICA:
DOCUMENTS FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE BILL OF RIGHTS 600, 602 (Jack N. Rakove ed.,
2006); accord RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION BY THE CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF
NEW-YORK (1788), reprinted in THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION: FEDERALIST AND
ANTIFEDERALIST SPEECHES, ARTICLES, AND LETTERS DURING THE STRUGGLE OVER
RATIFICATION, PART TWO 536, 538 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 6th ed. 1992) (articulating that accused
individuals should be granted assistance, in the form of counsel, for their defense).
25. STATE OF NORTH-CAROLINA IN CONVENTION (1788), reprinted in THE DEBATE ON
THE CONSTITUTION: FEDERALIST AND ANTIFEDERALIST SPEECHES, ARTICLES, AND LETTERS
DURING THE STRUGGLE OVER RATIFICATION, PART Two 565, 565-65 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 6th
ed. 1992).
26. See JAMES MADISON, SPEECH INTRODUCING AMENDMENTS IN THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES (1789), reprinted in FOUNDING AMERICA: DOCUMENTS FROM THE
REVOLUTION TO THE BILL OF RIGHTS 613, 616-19 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 2006) (listing the
proposed amendments to be made to the Constitution).
27. JAMES MADISON, SPEECH INTRODUCING PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS
(1789), reprinted in THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: PRIMARY SOURCES 332, 338-39 (Bruce Frohnen
ed., 2002).
28. AMENDMENTS PROPOSED BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (1789), reprinted in
FOUNDING AMERICA: DOCUMENTS FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE BILL OF RIGHTS 629, 631
(Jack N. Rakove ed., 2006); accord AMENDMENTS PROPOSED BY THE SENATE (1789), reprinted in
FOUNDING AMERICA: DOCUMENTS FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE BILL OF RIGHTS 632, 634
(Jack N. Rakove ed., 2006) (following Article the Ninth as similarly proposed by the House).
29. AMENDMENTS PROPOSED TO THE STATES (1789), reprinted in FOUNDING AMERICA:
DOCUMENTS FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE BILL OF RIGHTS 635, 637 (Jack N. Rakove ed.,
2006).
30. See id. (portraying the language of Article the Eighth proposed to the states); see also U.S.
CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
378
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Only one day prior to proposing Article the Eighth, the First Congress
approved the Judiciary Act of 1789.31 The Judiciary Act provided "[t]hat
in all the courts of the United States, the parties may plead and manage
their own causes personally or by the assistance of such counsel or
attorneys[-]at[-]law as by the rules of the said courts respectively shall be
permitted to manage and conduct causes therein."3 2  The following year,
Congress passed the first Federal Crimes Act.3 3 The Crimes Act provided:
[A]ny person who shall be accused and indicted of treason . .. shall also be
allowed and admitted to make his full defen[s]e by counsel learned in the
law; and the court before whom such person shall be tried, or some judge
thereof, shall, and they are hereby authorized and required immediately
upon his request to assign to such person such counsel, not exceeding two, as
such person shall desire, to whom such counsel shall have free access at all
seasonable hours.3 4
There does not appear to be a contemporary view that the Sixth
Amendment, the Judiciary Act of 1789, or the Crimes Act of 1790
intended to provide a cost-free or indigent-defense system. 3 5  Rather, the
Founders apparently intended only to ensure that when a defendant in a
federal prosecution wanted to be represented by counsel and could afford
counsel, counsel could not be denied. 6 The Founders' original view
remained intact for a century3 7  before contemporary Supreme Court
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defen[s]e.").
31. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
32. Id. § 35.
33. Federal Crimes Act of 1790, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 112.
34. Id. § 29.
35. See HUGH RICHARD WILLIAMS, THE HISTORY OF THE RIGHT TO FREE COUNSEL IN
AMERICA 8 (rev. ed. 2004), available at http://pol.illinoisstate.edu/downloads/icsps.papers/20
0 4 /
williamsl23.pdf ("No language in the definition of employ would suggest the[r]e was a guarantee of
free counsel for the indigent under the Body of Liberties.").
36. E.g., id. at 8, 20 (stating that "the Framers never intended the Sixth Amendment to do
anything else other than allow people the right to use counsel if they could afford it").
37. See United States v. Van Duzee, 140 U.S. 169, 173 (1891) ("There is no other statutory
provision[] for . .. procuring the assistance of counsel . . . ."); Nabb v. United States, I Ct. Cl. 173,
173 (1864) (articulating that the Act of 1790 "does not authorize the court to contract with such
counsel on the credit of the United States"). Van Duzee asked the Court to consider whether fees to
clerks were recoverable. See Van Duzee, 140 U.S. at 173 ( "There is, however, no general obligation
on the part of the government . . . [to] retain counsel for defendants or prisoners. The object of
the [Sixth Amendment] was merely to secure those rights which by the ancient rules of the common
law had been denied to them; but it was not contemplated that this should be done at the expense of
the government."). In Nabb, defense attorneys, assigned by the Circuit Court of the United States
2012] 379
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jurisprudence altered the Founders' vision.
38
B. Contemporary Development
In Powell v. Alabama,3 9 the Supreme Court held that defendants are
denied the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause
when a state denies defendants the right to counsel.40 Powell, an
African-American man, and two other men were charged with the rape of
two Caucasian women.4" The defendants were tried separately, each
found guilty, and sentenced to death.42 The defendants "were not asked
whether they had, or were able to employ, counsel, or wished to have
counsel appointed."4 3  The Court was not swayed by the trial court
generally "appoint[ing] all the members of the bar for the purpose of
arraigning the defendants and then ... continu[ing] to help them if no
counsel appears."4 The Court held that "the right to have counsel
appointed, when necessary, is a logical corollary from the constitutional
right to be heard by counsel," reasoning that anything less, particularly in a
capital case, "would be little short of judicial murder."4 5
Six years later, in Johnson v. Zerbst,"6 the Court held that a trial judge
for Missouri, sued the government for their fees based on an implied contract theory. Nabb, 1 Ct.
Cl. at 173. The Court held that the government was not liable for the defense's attorneys fees,
stating:
The [Sixth] [A]mendment [to] the Constitution provides that the accused shall enjoy the right
to have counsel. This is the declaration of a right in the accused, but not of any liability on the
part of the United States. In furtherance of the right, the [Federal Crimes] [A]ct of 1790 directs
the [C]ourt to assign to the accused such counsel as he shall request. But it does not authorize
the court to contract with such counsel on the credit of the United States; and the action,
therefore, of the [C]ourt in this case furnishes no inference of any such contract.
Id. at 173. The Court reasoned that the attorneys "might have refused the appointment and did
not." Id
38. See infra Part I.B.
39. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
40. Id at 59-60, 71; cf HUGH RICHARD WILLIAMS, THE HISTORY OF THE RIGHT TO FREE
COUNSEL IN AMERICA 23-28 (rev. ed. 2004), available at http://pol.illinoisstate.eduldownloads/
icsps-papers/2004/williamsl23.pdf (suggesting that Powell is an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel case
rather than a Sixth Amendment case). Based on this reasoning, Powell could not fall under the
selective incorporation theory. HUGH RICHARD WILLIAMS, THE HISTORY OF THE RIGHT TO FREE
COUNSEL IN AMERICA 25-26 (rev. ed. 2004), available at http://pol.illinoisstate.edu/downloads/
icsps-papers/2004/williamsl23.pdf.
41. Powell, 287 U.S. at 49.
42. Id at 49-50, 52.
43. Id. at 52.
44. Id. at 53.
45. Id. at 72.
46. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
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has a duty to ensure that the defendant's rights are protected.17  The
Court stated: "Since the Sixth Amendment constitutionally entitles one
charged with crime to the assistance of counsel, compliance with this
constitutional mandate is . .. essential . . . to a federal court's authority."48
However, in a 1942 decision, Bets v. Brady, 9 the Court backtracked. 5 0
In Betts, the trial judge refused a defendant's request for court-appointed
counsel, relying on the fact that it was not the practice in that county to
provide indigent defense. 5 ' The Court held that "[t]he Sixth Amendment
of the national Constitution applies only to trials in federal courts." 5 2 The
Court continued by offering a dizzying interpretation of incorporation:
The [D]ue [P]rocess [C]lause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not
incorporate, as such, the specific guarantees found in the Sixth Amendment
although a denial by a state of rights or privileges specifically embodied in
that and others of the first eight amendments may, in certain circumstances,
or in connection with other elements, operate, in a given case, to deprive a
litigant of due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth.5 3
By the early 1960s, the ambiguity of the Bets decision was laid to
rest.54 In 1961, in the unanimous Hamilton v. Alabama55 decision, the
Supreme Court held that:
The guiding hand of counsel is needed at the trial "lest the unwary concede
that which only bewilderment or ignorance could justify or pay a penalty
47. Id. at 465 ("The constitutional right of an accused to be represented by counsel invokes, of
itself, the protection of a trial court, in which the accused-whose life or liberty is at stake-is
without counsel."). The Johnson Court noted that the trial judge has a "serious and weighty
responsibility" to determine whether the defendant waived the right to counsel. Id. "While an
accused may waive the right to counsel, whether there is a proper waiver should be clearly determined
by the trial court, and it would be fitting and appropriate for that determination to appear upon the
record." Id.
48. Id. at 467.
49. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
50. See generally id. at 461-62 (examining an instance where a defendant was unable to call an
attorney for assistance because the Supreme Court limited the Sixth Amendment's application to
federal cases by stating the right was not incorporated).
51. Id at 457, 473 ("As we have said, the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the conviction and
incarceration of one whose trial is offensive to the common and fundamental ideas of fairness and
right, and while want of counsel in a particular case may result in a conviction lacking in such
fundamental fairness, we cannot say that the amendment embodies an inexorable command that no
trial for any offense, or in any court, can be fairly conducted and justice accorded a defendant who is
not represented by counsel.").
52. Id. at 461 (citations omitted).
53. Id. (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
54. See Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54-55 (1961) (requiring counsel to be present for
defendants at arraignment in a state matter).
55. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
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which is greater than the law of the [s]tate exacts for the offense which they
in fact and in law committed." . . . When one pleads to a capital charge
without benefit of counsel, we do not stop to determine whether prejudice
resulted. 6
Thus, particular circumstances, as previously mandated by Betts, were no
longer required to receive Sixth Amendment protection.
Two years later, Gideon v. Wainright set the contemporary standard
regarding felony prosecutions. 5 8  Gideon was charged with breaking and
entering into a pool hall, a felony in Florida.5 9  Gideon specifically
invoked his constitutional right to counsel but was informed by the trial
judge that "[u]nder the laws of the State of Florida, the only time the
[c]ourt can appoint [c]ounsel to represent a [d]efendant is when that
person is charged with a capital offense." 6 0  However, the Court granted
certiorari and appointed counsel to present Gideon's argument."
The Court applied its earlier decisions in Powell and Zerbst, affirming
the fundamental nature of the right to counsel as applied to the states.6 2
The Court declared that "[t]he right of one charged with crime to counsel
may not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some
countries, but it is in ours."6 3 The Court reasoned that if prosecutors are
deemed essential to protect the rights of the public, it is similarly essential
that a defendant's rights be protected by counsel. 6' Recognizing that a
defendant's rights "cannot be realized if the poor man charged with crime
has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him,"6 5 the unanimous
decision firmly established the indigent defendant's right to counsel in
felony prosecutions, at government expense, in both federal and state
courts. 6 6
Many Supreme Court cases followed to refine and expand the
guarantees originally granted in Gideon. Issues the Court have decided
include:
56. Id. at 54-55 (citations omitted).
57. Betts, 316 U.S. at 462.
58. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-45 (1963) (expanding the right of indigents
to defense counsel to include all criminal trials).
59. Id. at 336-37.
60. Id. at 337.
61. Id at 338.
62. Id at 341-44 (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 65 (1932)).
63. Id. at 344.
64. Id
65. Id.
66. See id. at 343-44 (providing the right to counsel in all criminal prosecutions).
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* Douglas v. California 6 -Right to counsel on first appeal of right;6 8
* White v. Maryland 9-Right to counsel at critical stages includes the
preliminary hearing and entering a plea;7 0
* Massiah v. United States71 -Right to counsel during police questioning
after formal charges; 7 2
* Escobedo v. Illinois7 3-Right to counsel during police questioning before
formal charges; 7 4
* Miranda v. Arizona7 5 -Right to counsel during custodial questioning;7 6
* In re Gaul?7-Right of juveniles to have counsel when confinement is a
possibility;7 8
* Mempa v. Rhay-Indigent's right to counsel "at every stage of a criminal
proceeding where substantial rights of a criminal accused may be affected,"
including the sentencing stage; 80
* Argersinger v. Hamlinal-Right to counsel for misdemeanors when
confinement is a possibility;8 2
* Ross v. Mofit 3-No right to counsel on discretionary appeals;8 4
* Scott v. Illinois8 -No right to counsel for misdemeanors when
confinement is not a possibility. 8 6
As early as 1857, the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provided for
court-appointed counsel for indigents at arraignment.1 7  However, not all
67. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
68. Id. at 356-57.
69. White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963).
70. Id. at 60.
71. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
72. Id. at 205.
73. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
74. Id. at 487, 492.
75. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
76. Id. at 498-99 ("In dealing with custodial interrogation, we will not presume that a
defendant has been effectively apprised of his rights and that his privilege against self-incrimination
has been adequately safeguarded on a record that does not show that any warnings have been given or
that any effective alternative has been employed.").
77. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
78. Id. at 36.
79. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
80. Id. at 134.
81. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
82. See id. at 40 ("LElvery judge will know when the trial of a misdemeanor starts that no
imprisonment may be imposed, even though local law permits it, unless the accused is represented by
counsel.").
83. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
84. Id. at 610.
85. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
86. Id. at 373-74.
87. See Marin v. State, 891 S.W.2d 267, 269 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (commenting on the
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states were bound to provide defendants, including indigent defendants,
the right to counsel."8
III. DEVELOPMENT OF CONTEMPORARY INDIGENT DEFENSE
The individual states, tasked with developing indigent-defense systems,
received little guidance after Gideon and Argersinger." Various methods
of implementing the mandate have developed. The most common are: a
public-defender system, assigned counsel utilizing a "wheel-like" system,
individual contracts, and a private-defender model.9 0 Also, there has been
a recent suggestion to create a free-market system through the use of
vouchers.91 An analysis of the structure and function of these systems
follows.
A. Public-Defender Model
In a traditional public-defender system, attorneys are hired as full-time
instructive use of historical statutes that provided for appointment of indigent defense counsel). The
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals stated:
The [appointed-counsel statute] has a legislative history spanning more than 130 years and six
amendments.
The 1857 Code of Criminal Procedure provided: "When the defendant is brought into
[c]ourt, for the purpose of being arraigned, if it appear[s] that he has no counsel, and is too poor
to employ counsel, the [c]ourt shall appoint one or more [practicing] attorneys to defend him."
Id.
88. See Note, An Historical Argument for the Right to Counsel During Police Interrogation, 73
YALE L.J. 1000, 1030-31 (1964) (examining pre-1800 right-to-counsel statutes and constitutional
provisions in Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, South Carolina, New York, New Jersey, North
Carolina, Rhode Island, and Georgia); see also HUGH RICHARD WILLIAMS, THE HISTORY OF THE
RIGHT TO FREE COUNSEL IN AMERICA 11-19 (rev. ed. 2004), available at http://pol.illinoisstate.
eduldownloads/icsps-papers/2004/williamsl23.pdf (discussing the various states' approaches to the
right to counsel).
89. See THE SPANGENBERG GRP., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCI 181160, CONTRACTING FOR
INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES: A SPECIAL REPORT 3 (2000), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffilesl/bja/181160.pdf (presenting various types of indigent-defense systems used throughout
several states and commenting on the positive and negative attributes of each system).
90. See HOLLY R. STEVENS ET AL., STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT
DEFENDANTS, AM. BAR ASS'N, STATE, COUNTY AND LOCAL EXPENDITURES FOR INDIGENT
DEFENSE SERVICES FISCAL YEAR 2008 1-2 (2010), available at http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/abaladministrativellegal-aid indigent defendants/1s sclaiddef expenditures-fy08.aut
hcheckdam.pdf (providing a thorough snapshot of indigent-defense systems used in all states,
including expenditures).
91. See Lew Kendall, The Indigent Accused As a Consumer of Defense Services: Experimentation
with Supplementary Voucher Systems, CAL. ATT'YS FOR CRIM. JUST., Sept.-Oct. 1982, at 24, 28
(announcing the advantages of the voucher system as going "a long way toward mitigating the
dissatisfaction of the currently captive consumers of public[-]defender services").
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employees of a government-funded office.9 Typically, when an indigent
is charged with a crime requiring appointment of counsel, a judge appoints
the public defender's office and does not select the individual attorney(s)
who will handle the case-that decision is left to the chief public
defender.9 3  Attorneys in this system are typically hired by a chief public
defender." The manner of selecting the chief public defender varies by
state. 9 5  In several states, including Florida, Nebraska, Tennessee, and
parts of California, the chief public defender is elected. 9' In other states,
the county appoints a chief defender.9 7  In the remaining states, judges
make the appointment.98
Public-defender systems provide in-house training and supervision."
The government entity funding the public defender office covers office
expenses and overhead expenditures, and it provides insurance as well as
support staff, investigators, and other professional assistance. 100
The public-defender system is the primary method of providing
92. BEXAR CNTY. TASK FORCE ON INDIGENT DEF., MEETING PRESENTATION, THE PUBLIC
DEFENDER MODEL 2 (Mar. 9, 2011), available at http://www.bexar.org/Indigent/public defender
model20110309.ppt.
93. E.g., Phyllis E. Mann, Ethical Obligations of Indigent Defense Attorneys to Their Clients, 75
MO. L. REV. 715, 726 (2010) (describing what the author terms as the assigned-counsel model).
There are variations on the assigned-counsel model, including a model where "a single assigned
counsel administrator who selects the attorney" or a model where "the chief public defender has
responsibility for administering the appointment rotation." Id.
94. See id (explaining that the chief public defender selects the attorneys for individual cases).
95. See STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, AM. BAR Ass'N, TEN
PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM 2 (2002), available at http://www.american
bar.org/content/dam/abalmigrated/legalservices/downloads/sclaidlindigentdefense/tenprinciplesbook
et.authcheckdam.pdf (reiterating that the selection of a chief public defender should be chosen "on
the basis of merit").
96. STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER & DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, CATO INST. POLICY ANALYSIS, NO.
666, REFORMING INDIGENT DEFENSE: HOW FREE MARKET PRINCIPLES CAN HELP TO FIX A
BROKEN SYSTEM 6 (2010), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa666.pdf.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. E g., Adele Bernhard, Raising the Bar: Standards-Based Training, Supervision, andEvaluation,
75 Mo. L. REV. 831, 844 (2010) ("Most large public defender offices in major urban areas provide
training for new lawyers.. . . Many offices also provide continuing legal education for their staff.");
see Jonathan A. Rapping, You Can't Build on Shaky Ground: Laying the Foundation for Indigent
Defense Reform Through Values-Based Recruitment, Training, and Mentoring, 3 HARV. L. & POL'Y
REV. 161, 161-62 (2009) (discussing a successful Georgia Public Defender training method known
as the Georgia Public Defender Standards Council Honors Program).
100. Eg., W. VA. PUBLIC DEFENDER SERVS., ANNUAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2009-2010 12-
14 (2010), available at http://www.wvpds.org (follow "Fiscal Year Reports" hyperlink; then follow
"Fiscal Year 2010" hyperlink) (reporting financial data collected about public-defender operations in
the state for the purpose of evaluating the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of maintaining the public-
defender system).
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indigent defense in the nation's largest cities and counties."ox All states
offer some form of public-defender assistance through either a statewide
system or by systems organized at the a county level.1 0 2  According to a
report by the Bureau of Justice in 2007, 957 public defender offices
provided indigent defense in the United States. 10 3  Moreover, in states
where public-defender systems operate at a county level, like Texas,
counties within the state may provide indigent defense through other
mechanisms.'o For example, Bexar County, which is mostly comprised
of San Antonio, Texas, operates a public-defender's office for appeals but
not for trial representation.' 0 5
Even when a government entity provides a public-defender program, a
need remains for a mechanism to appoint additional attorneys because
conflicts of interest may develop, such as when multiple defendants are
charged with the same crime.' 0 6  Also, defender caseloads may increase
101. LYNN LANGTON & DONALD J. FAROLE, JR., OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICES, 2007- STATISTICAL TABLES 1-2 (rev. ed. 2010),
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdflpdo07st.pdf; LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF
THE Hous. AREA EDUC. FUND, FACTS & ISSUES: PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICE FOR HARRIS
COUNTY 2 (2009), available at http://www.lwvhouston.org/pdfs/PDOFactslssuesOct2009.pdf.
102. LYNN LANGTON & DONALD J. FAROLE, JR., OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICES, 2007- STATISTICAL TABLES 2 (rev. ed. 2010),
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/pdo07st.pdf.
103. Id. at 1-2.
104. ALLAN K. BUTCHER & MICHAEL K. MOORE, COMM. ON LEGAL SERVS. TO THE POOR
IN CRIMINAL MATTERS, STATE BAR OF TEx., MUTING GIDEONS TRUMPET: THE CRISIS OF
INDIGENT CRIMINAL DEFENSE IN TEXAS 6-8 (2000), available at http://www.uta.edulpols/moore/
indigent/last.doc.
105. See TEX. TASK FORCE ON INDIGENT DEF., FAIR DEFENSE LAW: A PRIMER FOR TEXAS
OFFICIALS 6-7 (2011), available at http://www.courts.state.tx.us/tfid/pdf/FairDefenseLawAPrimer
forTexasOfficialsJan2O 11.pdf (illustrating that the only public defender office in Bexar County,
Texas, deals with appellate work rather than trial representation). Pursuant to H.B. 1754, the Task
Force on Indigent Defense (TFID) became the Texas Indigent Defense Commission (TIDC).
TEXAS INDIGENT DEFENSE COMMISSION, http://www.txcourts.gov/tidc/tidchome.asp (follow
"Who We Are and What We Do" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 1, 2012); accord TEX. H.B. 1754, 82d
Leg., R.S. (2011) (changing the name of the Texas entity responsible for indigent defense from Task
Force on Indigent Defense to the Texas Indigent Defense Commission).
106. E.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. § 26.044(j)(1) (West Supp. 2011) (articulating that
"[a) public defender's office may not accept an appointment ... if... a conflict of interest exists that
has not been waived by the client"); see Peter W. Tague, Multiple Representation and Conflicts of
Interest in Criminal Cases, 67 GEO. L.J. 1075, 1123-24 (1979) ("An indigent's representation may
suffer if, as commonly happens, different public defenders represent the defendant at different stages
of the proceedings. These problems are exacerbated if the public defender must represent
simultaneously more than one defendant in the case."); Nancy J. Moore, Conflicts of Interest in the
Simultaneous Representation of Multiple Clients: A Proposed Solution to the Current Confision and
Controversy, 61 TEx. L. REV. 211, 239 n.142 (1982) (commenting on a District of Columbia policy
to appoint "separate counsel for indigent defendants" unless the court gave approval for a joint-
counsel request).
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beyond what some believe to be an acceptable level. 1 o7
There are drawbacks to every system.1 o A public-defender system
cannot handle the entire indigent caseload,109 so an additional mechanism
must always be in place.11 o There are also some perception problems. It
is not uncommon for indigent defendants to view court-appointed
attorneys as less competent or zealous than paid, private attorneys. 11
When a defendant is asked if he has an attorney, observers note a common
response of "No, I have a public defender."' 12 As in other
government-funded systems, defendants cannot select their own public
defenders.1 13 In addition, the costs associated with operating a public
107. But see MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 2 (2002) ("A lawyer's workload
must be controlled so that each matter can be handled competently."). See generally STANDING
COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, AM. BAR ASS'N, EIGHT GUIDELINES OF
PUBLIC DEFENSE RELATED TO EXCESSIVE WORKLOADS 3 (2009), available at http://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/abaladministrative/legal-aid-indigent-defendants/s sclaid def abas
claidrevisedtrpt_119 eight-guidelines.authcheckdam.pdf (offering a plan to help public-defense
providers meet professional obligations when faced with excessive caseloads).
108. Cf Phyllis E. Mann, Ethical Obligations of Indigent Defense Attorneys to Their Clients, 75
MO. L. REV. 715, 725-26 (2010) (describing the various delivery method systems for
public-defender services and the conflicts created by the systems).
109. See STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, AM. BAR ASS'N,
EIGHT GUIDELINES OF PUBLIC DEFENSE RELATED TO EXCESSIVE WORKLOADS 3-6 (2009),
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abaladministrative/legal-aid indigent
defendants/Is sclaid def aba sclaid-revised rpt 119-eight-guidelines.authcheckdam.pdf (providing
guidelines to consider "when excessive workloads are present").
110. Note, Effectively Ineffective: The Failure of Courts to Address Underfunded Indigent Systems,
118 HARV. L. REv. 1731, 1733 (2005) ("To generate more effective reform, courts must adopt a
more aggressive role as enforcers of the right to counsel by tackling the problem of indigent defense
on a systemic level, ordering the expenditure of funds necessary to protect the right to counsel, and
creating oversight mechanisms to ensure the continued implementation of their remedies.").
111. Compare Andrew Horwitz, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases: The Law and the
Reality in Rhode Island District Court, 9 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 409, 421-22 (2004)
(criticizing the implication that a public defender was not an attorney), with Harold H. Chen, Note,
Malpractice Immunity: An Illegitimate and Ineffective Response to the Indigent-Defense Crisis, 45 DUKE
L.J. 783, 792 (1996) ("In sum, the defender assumes 'all the obligations and protections attendant
upon a private attorney-client relationship except one: the public pays his fee."' (quoting Reese v.
Danforth, 406 A.2d 735, 739 (Pa. 1979))).
112. Andrew Horwitz, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases: The Law and the Reality in
Rhode Island District Court, 9 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 409, 421 n.77 (2004) (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted); accord Nancy J. Moore, Conflicts of Interest in the Simultaneous
Representation of Multiple Clients: A Proposed Solution to the Current Confision and Controversy, 61
TEX. L. REV. 211, 277 n.35 4 (1982) (reiterating the confusion experienced by indigent defendants
regarding the public defender's role as an attorney).
113. See STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER & DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, CATO INST. POLICY ANALYSIS,
NO. 666, REFORMING INDIGENT DEFENSE: How FREE MARKET PRINCIPLES CAN HELP TO FIX A
BROKEN SYSTEM 3 (2010), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa666.pdf (bemoaning the
current public-defender system "in which judges or court administrators assign to the [indigent]
defendant an attorney selected from the private bar").
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defender office, particularly start-up costs, are substantial.' '
A troubling aspect of indigent-defense operations involves public
defenders engaging in strikes, slow-downs, and litigation against the
government funders over working conditions.' 15 Parts IV and V of this
Article explore the ethical issues raised by these situations and others.
B. Assigned Counsel via the Wheel/Registry
Another method of obtaining legal representation for indigents is the
assigned-counsel mechanism, also known as a wheel."' Under this
approach, individual attorneys in private practice are appointed by the
court."' In 2010, approximately 20% of American counties used this
model as the sole method for indigent defense." 1 Even in jurisdictions
where a public-defender approach is utilized, the rotating system of private
appointments supplements indigent representation where overloads or
114. See LYNN LANGTON & DONALD J. FAROLE, JR., OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICES, 2007- STATISTICAL TABLES 1-2 (rev. ed. 2010),
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/pdo07st.pdf (reporting the operating costs of
public defender offices in the United States). The Texas Indigent Defense Commission offers three
formula grants and four discretionary grants to improve delivery of indigent defense services. Grant
Program, TEx. INDIGENT DEF. COMMISSION, http://www.txcourts.gov/tidc/TFIDGrant_
Program.asp (last visited Feb. 28, 2012).
115. See Robert Patrick, Public Defender Rules Are Set to Change, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH,
July 2, 2005, http://www.nlada.org/DMS/Documents/11 20663507.69/documentinfo (discussing a
strike to oppose the habit of pleading for defendants after a brief attorney-client meeting "because it's
unethical and unprofessional to try to represent defendants with only minutes to familiarize
themselves with the cases."); see also Kathleen Burge, Lawyers for Poor Feel Slap from US,
BOSTON.COM NEWS, Oct. 17, 2003, http://www.boston.com/news/local/articles/2003/10/171
lawyers-for-poor-feel-slap-from-us/ (reporting practitioners' refusal to accept new cases and the
governor's $13 million funding reduction to the Committee for Public Council Services, an indigent-
defense provider in Massachusetts); Lise Olse, Lauyers Strike Back in Clark County, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER REP., Apr. 28, 2003, http://www.seattlepi.com/news/article/Lawyers-strike-back-in-
Clark-County-1 113490.php (relaying a strike by Seattle indigent defense providers that opposed low
pay). See generally Brandon Buskey, When Public Defenders Strike: Exploring How Public Defenders
Can Utilize the Lessons of Public Choice Theory to Become Effective Political Actors, 1 HARV. L. &
POL'Y REV. 533, 534, 536 (2007) (conveying the economic pressures facing public defender offices
participating in strikes and their refusal to accept clients).
116. Eg., Department Trend, Texas'New Approach to Indigent Defense, 65 TEX. B.J. 967, 967
(2002) (describing the wheel system as one where "the judge appoints the next attorney on an
appointment list rather than choosing an attorney him or herself').
117. See Mark Hansen, Development, Indigent Defense Fee Abuses Found, 78 A.B.A. J. 29, 29
(1992) (construing the wheel system as one in which "cases [are] assigned on a rotating basis
depending on a lawyer's qualifications and expertise").
118. STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER & DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, CATO INST. POLICY ANALYSIS,
NO. 666, REFORMING INDIGENT DEFENSE: How FREE MARKET PRINCIPLES CAN HELP TO FIX A
BROKEN SYSTEM 9-10 (2010), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa666.pdf.
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ethical conflicts develop. 19 In Texas, the wheel system is the default
mechanism employed when counties cannot otherwise agree on
establishing defender offices. 1 2 0
Under this system, a judge or court official appoints an attorney. 12 1 In
Texas and in other jurisdictions, the judge chooses the names of
participating attorneys from a rotating wheel. 122  In Texas, a judge that
requests attorneys will select from the next five names on the list. 123  In a
system without a mandatory wheel, judges are free to select counsel based
on the judge's own awareness of the attorney's ability.1 24  Theoretically,
under a computer-generated wheel, judges are limited in their discretion
because they are required to name an attorney from the
randomly-generated wheel. 12 5  In practice, however, judges will often
119. Cf Andrew Lucas Blaize Davies & Alissa Pollitz Worden, State Politics and the Right to
Counsel A Comparative Analysis, 43 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 187, 189 (2009) (explaining that the
rotating system is "typically administered by local court staff').
120. Article 26.0 4 (a) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedureprovides:
The judges of the county courts, statutory county courts, and district courts trying criminal
cases in each county, by local rule, shall adopt and publish written countywide procedures for
timely and fairly appointing counsel for an indigent defendant in the county arrested for or
charged with a misdemeanor punishable by confinement or a felony. The procedures must be
consistent with this article and Articles 1.051, 15.17, 26.05, and 26.052. A court shall appoint
an attorney from a public appointment list using a system of rotation, unless the court appoints
an attorney under Subsection (0, (h), or (i). The court shall appoint attorneys from among the
next five names on the appointment list in the order in which the attorneys' names appear on
the list, unless the court makes a finding of good cause on the record for appointing an attorney
out of order. An attorney who is not appointed in the order in which the attorney's name
appears on the list shall remain next in order on the list.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.04(a) (West Supp. 2011); see TEX. TASK FORCE ON
INDIGENT DEF., FAIR DEFENSE LAW: A PRIMER FOR TEXAS OFFICIALS 6-7 (2011), available at
http://www.courts.state.tx.us/tfid/pdf/FairDefenseLawAPrimerforTexasOfficialsJan2011 .pdf
(explaining that Texas has two managed assigned-counsel programs and eighteen public defender
offices that cover twenty-one counties).
121. Department Trend, Texas' New Approach to Indigent Defense, 65 TEX. B.J. 967, 967
(2002).
122. CRIM. PROC. art. 26.04(a).
123. Id.
124. ALLAN K. BUTCHER & MICHAEL K. MOORE, COMM. ON LEGAL SERVS. TO THE POOR
IN CRIMINAL MATTERS, STATE BAR OF TEX., MUTING GIDEONS TRUMPET: THE CRISIS OF
INDIGENT CRIMINAL DEFENSE IN TEXAS 5, 10-12 n.13 (2000), available at
http://www.uta.edu/pols/moore/indigent/last.doc (reporting the results of a study that surveyed 494
Texas judges, finding that 50.8% of the judges admitted they did "not have formal criteria for
selecting attorneys in complex or special cases (e.g., mental illness, DNA, etc.)" and that 65% of
judges considered an attorney's qualifications when making appointments).
125. Cf Mark Hansen, Development, Indigent Defense Fee Abuses Found, 78 A.B.A. J. 29, 29
(1992) (acknowledging the ABA standards, which announce that "the selection of lawyers for specific
cases should not be made by judges or elected officials, but by the administrators of an independent
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name attorneys who are not listed next on the wheel. 126  Recently, an
evaluation of Bexar County appointments indicated that judges frequently
appointed attorneys who were not even listed on the wheel. 12 7
Typically, attorneys are required to qualify for participation in
appointment programs. 12 8  In rare instances, they can be removed from
the list for legal and ethical violations.129 However, no formal training or
supervision programs are in place under this plan.1 3 0  Attorneys usually
provide their own staff, insurance, office space, and overhead, but in some
instances, the government entity will furnish some access to
investigators.' 3 '
Drawbacks exist under this system.1 32  Attorneys who sign up to
participate on the wheel are often inexperienced. 13 3  Once attorneys
acquire experience, many no longer participate.1 3 4
While some informal mentoring systems exist, wheel attorneys are not
assigned-counsel program").
126. TEx. TASK FORCE ON INDIGENT DEF., REVIEW OF BEXAR COUNTY'S INDIGENT
DEFENSE SYSTEMS 22 (2010), available at http://www2.mysanantonio.com/PDFs/BexarReview
FinalO81610.pdf ("Bexar County had 355 attorneys on the misdemeanor appointment list for at least
part of the year, but 229 additional attorneys received appointments.").
127. Id. at 23, 25 ("Bexar County had 390 attorneys on trial-level felony appointment lists for
at least part of the year, but 101 additional attorneys received appointment." (footnote omitted)).
128. Id. at 17; see, e.g., BEXAR CNTY. TASK FORCE ON INDIGENT DEF., BEXAR CNTY.
CRIMINAL DIST. COURTS PLAN: STANDARDS & PROCEDURES RELATED TO APPOINTMENT OF
COUNSEL FOR INDIGENT DEFENDANTS 26-27, available at http://www.bexar.org/Indigent/
districtcourtpresentation201105l0.ppt (presenting reasons an attorney in Bexar County may be
removed from the wheel list);
129. ALLAN K. BUTCHER & MICHAEL K. MOORE, COMM. ON LEGAL SERVS. TO THE POOR
IN CRIMINAL MATTERS, STATE BAR OF TEX., MUTING GIDEO'S TRUMPET: THE CRISIS OF
INDIGENT CRIMINAL DEFENSE IN TExAS 7 (2000), available at http://www.uta.edu/pols/
moore/indigent/last.doc.
130. Id. at 12.
131. Eg., TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.052 (West Supp. 2011) (explaining the
procedure for both appointment of counsel in a death penalty case and the reimbursement of
investigative expenses).
132. ALLAN K. BUTCHER & MICHAEL K. MOORE, COMM. ON LEGAL SERVS. TO THE POOR
IN CRIMINAL MATTERS, STATE BAR OF TEx., MUTING GIDEO'S TRUMPET: THE CRISIS OF
INDIGENT CRIMINAL DEFENSE IN TEXAS 5 (2000), available at http://www.uta.edulpols/moore/
indigent/last.doc ("One of the concerns that some have with the assigned[-]counsel system is that it
often results in a revolving door of young or beginning attorneys who accept appointed cases only to
gain needed experience and establish themselves in the community.").
133. Id.
134. Id. at 4-5. A random survey of 1,376 criminal defense practitioners, 1,113 Texas
prosecutors, and 494 Texas judges with criminal jurisdictions revealed that 48.3% of defense
attorneys represent fewer indigent defendants as the attorneys' careers progress. Id. at 5.
Additionally, 59.2% of defense attorneys believe that retained counsel offer more experience than
court-appointed counsel. Id. This belief is also held by 27.6% of prosecutors and 31.2% of judges.
Id.
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subject to the formal supervision and training that is found in a
public-defender system.' 3 5 As a result, individual defendants assigned a
wheel attorney do not receive representation on par with those represented
by a public defender. Some wheel attorneys openly complain about the
small fees. 1 3  Others undertake private cases in order to make up for what
they perceive to be inequitable pay.' 37  One wheel attorney admitted at a
public hearing that he padded his bills because of the low fee schedule.' 3 1
A dilemma arises for the judge.1 3 9  What should a judge do when he
recognizes the next names on the wheel as attorneys who are incompetent,
unethical, or, at a minimum, unequal to their adversary in the
courtroom?' 4 0 If the judge appoints the wheel attorney who fails to meet
minimum standards of competency, there is a risk to both the client and
the system of justice.' If the judge selects what he perceives to be a
more ethical attorney, the judge is open to an accusation of favoritism. 14 2
135. Id. at 7, 12; see, e.g., TEX. TASK FORCE ON INDIGENT DEF., REVIEW OF BEXAR
COUNTY'S INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMS 17 (2010), available at http://www2.mysanantonio.com/
PDFs/BexarReviewFinal081610.pdf (explaining the CLE requirements for an attorney to maintain
their position on the list).
136. See STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, AM. BAR ASS'N,
GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA'S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUALJUSTICE 9-10 (2004),
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abaladministrative/legal-aid-indigent-
defendants/Is sclaid def bp right_to_counsel-incriminal-proceedings.authcheckdam.pdf
(remarking that many practitioners confirmed that the low pay kept many from providing indigent
defense services). This view was repeatedly expressed at the public hearing of the Bexar County Task
Force on Indigent Defense, chaired by this author, in San Antonio, Texas, from January to May
2011.
137. See id
138. This remark was made by a San Antonio attorney in an open public hearing of the Bexar
County Task Force on Indigent Defense, chaired by this author, in San Antonio, Texas, January-
May 2011.
139. Compare EVE BRENSIKE PRIMUS, AM. CONSTITUTION SOC'Y FOR LAW & POLICY,
LITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR DEALING WITH THE INDIGENT DEFENSE CRISIS 3 (2010), available
at http://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Primus_--LitigationStrategies.pdf (implying that many
judges serve in elected capacities that are subject to political pressures to remain responsive to the
public), with Laura A. Bischoff, Some Lawyers Suspect Favoritism in Juvenile Court Appointments,
DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Mar. 6, 2010, http://www.dayrondailynews.com/news/dayton-news/some-
lawyers-suspect-favoritism-in-juvenile-court-appointments-584321.html (reporting an instance where
appointed attorneys also contributed to a judge's campaign).
140. EVE BRENSIKE PRIMUS, AM. CONSTITUTION SOC'Y FOR LAW & POLICY, LITIGATION
STRATEGIES FOR DEALING WITH THE INDIGENT DEFENSE CRISIS 3 (2010), available at
http://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Primus_-_Litigation-Strategies.pdf ("Nor are the state
judiciaries well-equipped to police the quality of indigent[-]defense representation.").
141. Cf id. (reiterating that the state judicial branch is unable to supervise indigent defense).
142. See Brian Chasnoff, Being a Favorite offudges Pays, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Nov.
6, 2010, http://www.mysanantonio.comlnews/local-news/article/being-a-favorite-of-judges-pays-
801940.php ("Echoing charges of favoritism in the courts, [a task force] concluded that too many
[indigent] cases were going to too few attorneys.").
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Judges are human too; there is an obvious temptation to appoint friends,
especially when those friends are campaign contributors.' 43  At the very
least, the appearance of bias leads to accusations of favoritism. 1 44  This
undermines public confidence in the bench, bar, and system of justice. 145
C. Individual Contracting
Contracting refers to indigent-defense programs which are funded by
the public at a state level, county level, or a combination of both." 6 The
contractor may be nonprofit or for-profit, full time or part time.' 4 7 This
may be a single attorney, law firm or an association of lawyers or law
firms. 1 4 8  The Bureau of Justice Assistance developed a monograph
discussing the many different types of contracting models. 14 9
143. See ALLAN K. BUTCHER & MICHAEL K. MOORE, COMM. ON LEGAL SERVS. TO THE
POOR IN CRIMINAL MATTERS, STATE BAR OF TEX., MUTING GIDEON'S TRUMPET: THE CRISIS OF
INDIGENT CRIMINAL DEFENSE IN TExAS 12 (2000), available at http://www.uta.edulpols/
moorelindigent/last.doc (surveying Texas judges' perceptions and experiences with favoritism). A
1995 survey of 494 Texas judges who had criminal jurisdictions reported that 39.5% of judges
believe their peers have made appointments due to personal friendship with the appointed attorney;
35.1% of judges admit to making a consideration of whether the attorney has been a political
supporter; and 30.3% admit to considering whether the attorney made campaign contributions. Id.
A Harris County defense attorney stated "I have been refused appointments because I cannot afford
to give money to the judge's reelection campaign[;] .. . those attorneys who contribute the most
money receive the most work." Id.
144. See Laura A. Bischoff, Some Lauyers Suspect Favoritism in Juvenile Court Appointments,
DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Mar. 6, 2010, http://www.daytondailynews.com/news/dayton-news/some-
lawyers-suspect-favoritism-in-juvenile-court-appointments-58
4 321.html ("[T]he distribution of the
cases show that the [wheel] system is not being strictly followed, and some attorneys wonder whether
favoritism plays a role in who gets the work.").
145. See ALLAN K. BUTCHER & MICHAEL K. MOORE, COMM. ON LEGAL SERVS. TO THE
POOR IN CRIMINAL MATTERS, STATE BAR OF TEX., MUTING GIDEON'S TRUMPET: THE CRISIS OF
INDIGENT CRIM. DEFENSE IN TExAS 7, 12 (2000), available at http://www.uta.edu/pols/moorel
indigent/last.doc ("Most disturbingly, the current system appears to provide a lower standard of
justice for the state's poor.").
146. THE SPANGENBERG GRP., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 181160, CONTRACTING FOR




149. Id. at 4. The report identifies six distinct variations of contracting and defines them as:
Fixed-Fee, All Cases-specifies the total amount of compensation the lawyer will receive for
work on all cases he or she is assigned during a specified contract period. The number of cases
assigned to the attorney is not capped; he or she is expected to accept all appointments that arise
in the jurisdiction except those in which there is a conflict of interest.
Fixed-Fee, Specific Type of Case-establishes the total amount of compensation the lawyer
will receive, but it specifies a particular type of case as well (e.g., all misdemeanors). There is no
limit to the number of cases an attorney will be assigned during the contract period.
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Counties may have several independent contractors providing indigent
defense.150 Typically in this system, a county government makes the
initial determination of awarding the contract.15 1 Subsequently, a judge
or court administrator assigns each case to the contracting individuals or
entities.. 1 52
Contracting is becoming more prevalent.153 This is credited to: (1) an
increase in the number of indigent defendants; (2) the need for
cost-reduction measures; and (3) the decline of workloads in public
defender offices. 154  In 2010, approximately 10% of counties utilized
contracting as their primary indigent-defense model, while many others
employed contracting to handle public-defender conflicts and
overloads.155
As with the other systems, there are potential problems. Awarding a
defense contract to political favorites creates the appearance of
favoritism.' 5 6  At least in this circumstance, however, the judiciary would
Flat Fee, Specific Number of Cases-pays a flat fee for all work completed based on a specific
number of cases the attorney agrees to accept during the contract period.
Flat Fee Per Case-establishes a fee by case type (e.g., $150 per misdemeanor), and the
attorney agrees to take all cases of that type that arise in the jurisdiction during the contract
period.
Hourly Fee With Caps-pays the attorney an hourly fee established in the contract but
includes a cap on the total amount of compensation he or she can receive. Once the ceiling is
reached, the attorney may be required to perform additional work without compensation.
Hourly Fee Without Caps-pays the attorney an hourly fee established in the contract, but
also covers the actual expenses of each case.
Id.
150. STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER & DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, CATO INST. POLICY ANALYSIS,
NO. 666, REFORMING INDIGENT DEFENSE: How FREE MARKET PRINCIPLES CAN HELP TO FIX A
BROKEN SYSTEM 8-9 (2010), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa666.pdf.
151. See, e.g., ALLAN K. BUTCHER & MICHAEL K. MOORE, COMM. ON LEGAL SERVS. TO
THE POOR IN CRIMINAL MATTERS, STATE BAR OF TEX., MUTING GIDEON'S TRUMPET: THE
CRISIS OF INDIGENT CRIM. DEFENSE IN TEXAS 4 (2000), available at http://www.uta.edulpols/
moore/indigent/last.doc (providing an example of a bar association transferring decisions regarding
indigent defense and financial burdens to the county).
152. STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER & DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, CATO INST. POLICY ANALYSIS,
NO. 666, REFORMING INDIGENT DEFENSE: How FREE MARKET PRINCIPLES CAN HELP TO FIX A
BROKEN SYSTEM 9 (2010), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa666.pdf.
153. THE SPANGENBERG GRP., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 181160, CONTRACTING FOR
INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES: A SPECIAL REPORT 3 (2000), available at http://www.ncirs.gov/
pdffiles1/bja/181160.pdf.
154. Id.
155. STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER & DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, CATO INST. POLICY ANALYSIS,
NO. 666, REFORMING INDIGENT DEFENSE: How FREE MARKET PRINCIPLES CAN HELP TO FIX A
BROKEN SYSTEM 9 (2010), available athttp://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa666.pdf.
156. THE SPANGENBERG GRP., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 181160, CONTRACTING FOR
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not be tainted since the contract is awarded by the government funder and
not by a judge. 1 5 7  There is also the common perception that contracts
may be awarded to the lowest bidder, regardless of the bidder's
capabilities. 1 5 " Again, as with the wheel, there is no formal mentoring or
training of individual contract attorneys. 1 5 9  However, a contracting law
firm or association of attorneys might have such mentoring and training
mechanisms in place within its firm or associations. 160 Governments are
probably better able to control costs under this system by capping a dollar
amount for the contracts and by requiring contracted attorneys to
represent all indigent defendants who may be charged during a particular
year.' 61
D. Private-Defender Model
A variation on the contracting theme is the private-defender
program.1 2 The county contracts with one private entity to handle the
INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES: A SPECIAL REPORT 19 (2000), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles1/bja/181160.pdf.
157. STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER & DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, CATO INST. POLICY ANALYSIS,
NO. 666, REFORMING INDIGENT DEFENSE: HOW FREE MARKET PRINCIPLES CAN HELP TO FIX A
BROKEN SYSTEM 9 (2010), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa666.pdf.
158. STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, AM. BAR ASS'N,
GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA'S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 12 n.85
(2004), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal aid
indigent defendants/Is_sclaiddef bp-rightto counselinscriminal-proceedings.authcheckdam.pdf
(referring to direct testimony received at hearings in Montana, Washington, Michigan, Alabama,
Georgia, and South Dakota). See generally THE SPANGENBERG GRP., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ
181160, CONTRACTING FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES: A SPECIAL REPORT 2 (2000),
available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/181160.pdf (explaining the practice of awarding
contracts to low-bidders).
159. See generally THE SPANGENBERG GRP., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 181160,
CONTRACTING FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES: A SPECIAL REPORT 13 (2000), available at
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffdeslbja/181160.pdf (noting that a deficient contract system includes poor
training and supervision).
160. But cf id. at 15 (providing an instance where the firm used "inexperienced lawyers" in a
contract for indigent defense).
161. Cf id. at 7 (recognizing that state legislatures require contracting in order to contain
government spending).
162. See STATE OF TEX. RESOLUTION OF THE TEX. JUDICIAL COUNCIL, SPECIFICALLY
AUTHORIZE MANAGED ASSIGNED COUNSEL PROGRAMS, available at http://www.courts.state.tx.usl
tjc/82ndLegislature/ResolutionsO 1262011 /Specificallyo/o2OAuthorize%2OManaged%2OAssigned%20
Counsel%20Programs.pdf ("These types of [private-defender] programs involve outsourcing to a
governmental or nonprofit agency, independent of the judiciary, the responsibility for screening
attorneys for court-appointment eligibility, assigning lawyers to individual cases, approving attorney
fee requests, and approving requests for investigative and expert assistance."). See generally PRIVATE
DEFENDER PROGRAM, SAN MATEO CNTY. BAR ASS'N, ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2009-2010
TO THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS 8-9 (2010) (explaining the appointment and assignment process
394
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entire indigent-defense program. 1 6 3  The Private Defender Program
(PDP) of the San Mateo County (California) Bar Association,' 6 4 which
began operation in 1969, is the best known program of this kind in the
country. 6 5  The program is operated by the San Mateo County Bar
Association under a contract with the county.166  The bar association
selects the chief defender.' 6 7  If a judge determines that a defendant is
indigent, the PDP is appointed.' 6  The PDP then assigns an individual
attorney to the case. 1 6 9
Attorneys who seek to participate must apply and are thoroughly
screened before being admitted to the program. 1 7 0  They receive constant
supervision and training thereafter.' 7 1  Unlike a public-defender system,
where an additional mechanism is needed when conflicts develop, no such
problem arises within the PDP because the chief defender can simply
assign alternate private attorneys where conflicts develop.' 72 Attorneys
provide their own office space and support staff, while the county provides
malpractice insurance and investigative services.1 7 3
The PDP has operated for over forty years and functions well with the
in a private-defender program).
163. E.g., PRIVATE DEFENDER PROGRAM, SAN MATEO CNTY. BAR ASs'N, ANNUAL REPORT:
FISCAL YEAR 2009-2010 TO THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS 10 (2010) (stating that "[a]ll of the
lawyers to whom cases are assigned are in private practice San Mateo County").
164. Id.
165. Id at 6.
166. Private Defender Program, SAN MATEO CNTY. B. ASS'N, https://www.smcba.org/For the
Public/PrivateDefenderProgram.aspx (last visited Mar. 1, 2012) ("While the contract with the
County has changed somewhat throughout the years, the basic plan has not. The County pays the
Bar Association the contract price in annual installments. The Bar Association provides attorneys to
represent those defendants found to be eligible by the Court, and provides investigative, expert, and
other ancillary services required to provide proper representation.").
167. PRIVATE DEFENDER PROGRAM, SAN MATEO CNTY. BAR ASS'N, ANNUAL REPORT:
FISCAL YEAR 2009-2010 TO THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS 6 (2010).
168. Id. at 8.
169. Id at 9.
170. Id. at 10.
171. Id. at 35-37, 39-40.
172. Private Defender Program, SAN MATEO CNTY. B. ASS'N, https://www.smcba.org/For the
Public/PrivateDefenderProgram.aspx (last visited Mar. 1, 2012) ("When the Private Defender
Program is appointed to represent several colIdefendants, the program is able to avoid the potential
conflict issue, because the program's involvement in the individual case is limited to assigning the
several clients to separate attorneys, each of whom is in private practice. This feature alone results in
the Private Defender Program being able to deliver lower cost indigent legal services than a Public
Defender office, because in co[]defendant cases the Public Defender may represent only one co-
defendant, and must refer all other co[]defendants to a costly conflicts panel.").
173. PRIVATE DEFENDER PROGRAM, SAN MATEO CNTY. BAR ASS'N, ANNUAL REPORT:
FISCAL YEAR 2009-2010 TO THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS 8, 14, 21, app. B (2010).
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active support of the bench, bar, and public.' 74  Indeed, the director of
the Texas Task Force on Indigent Defense, James Bethke, has identified
this program as one of the best, if not the best, indigent-defense programs
in the United States.' 7 5  However, one obstacle of this system is that it is
expensive, perhaps reflecting the economics of San Mateo County,
California itself.' 7' Another drawback of this system has been its limited
use thus far, although variations of it are now in place in two Texas
locations.' 7 7
E. Free-Market System
Some have suggested the utilization of a free-market system whereby the
state or county would provide indigent defendants with vouchers, which
they could then use to choose their own counsel.' 7 s A variation of this
system is in place in Ontario, Canada.' 7 9
While this system has not taken hold in this country, there are some
obvious and foreseeable problems.'o How would defendants, particularly
incarcerated defendants, choose an attorney?' 8 ' One can imagine the
174. Id. at 31-32 ("We value our relationships with the office of the District Attorney, the
SherifPs Department, the Probation Department, County Counsel, the Department of Health, and
the Human Services Agency.").
175. Sharon Keller, It's Official Sine Die 2011, TASK FORCE ON INDIGENT DEF. E-
NEWSLETTER (Austin, Tex.), June 2010, at 2, available at http://www.courts.state.tx.us/tfid/pdfl
June201 1newsletter.pdf.
176. PRIVATE DEFENDER PROGRAM, SAN MATEO CNTY. BAR ASS'N, ANNUAL REPORT:
FISCAL YEAR 2009-20 10 TO THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS app. D (2010) (budgeting approximately
$16 million for the county contract).
177. See LUBBOCK SPECIAL NEEDS DEFENDERS' OFFICE, http://www.courts.state.tx.us/tfid/
lsndo.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2011) ("This first-of-its-kind program in Texas provides specially
trained private practitioners to represent indigent criminal defendants who are diagnosed with a
serious mental illness or condition."); see also STATE OF TEX. RESOLUTION OF THE TEX. JUDICIAL
COUNCIL, SPECIFICALLY AUTHORIZE MANAGED ASSIGNED COUNSEL PROGRAMS, available at
http://www.courts.state.tx.us/tjc/82ndLegislature/Resolutions-0126201 1/SpecificallyAuthorize
ManagedAssignedCounselPrograms.pdf ("Lubbock County has recently established and
Montgomery County is establishing managed assigned counsel programs. These are modeled on the
private[-}defender program in San Mateo, California, where the county contracts with the local bar
association to manage the assigned counsel system.").
178. STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER & DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, CATO INST. POLICY ANALYSIS,
No. 666, REFORMING INDIGENT DEFENSE: How FREE MARKET PRINCIPLES CAN HELP TO FIX A
BROKEN SYSTEM 12 (2010), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa666.pdf
179. Id. at 14.
180. See Lew Kendall, The Indigent Accused As a Consumer of Defense Services: Experimentation
with Supplementary Voucher Systems, CAL. ATr'YS FOR CRIM. JUST., Sept.-Oct. 1982, at 24
(categorizing the use of the voucher system as experimental in nature).
181. See id. (proposing that "consumer choice be incorporated into indigent
defense... through supplementary voucher systems which would allow consumers to choose their
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scenes at the jail or courthouse during arraignment, where attorneys would
be on the lookout to announce their availability to potential clients.' 8 2
Also, a delay in selecting an attorney would result in additional
incarceration time, which would drive up government costs and add to the
backlog in the courts. 1 3
IV. ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS OF THE BAR AND BENCH
Despite the implementation and proposed implementation of these and
other mechanisms, there remains the widespread dissatisfaction with the
"broken" system noted above.' Why is it that, with the expenditure of
so much time, money, and effort thus far, our system remains broken and
in need of reform?' 8 5  Perhaps at least part of the difficulty lies in the
failure to fully consider and resolve the ethical and practical problems
associated with indigent defense."as
While it is fairly easy to identify general rules and standards, the failure
to produce an adequate indigent-defense system reflects poorly on the legal
profession that created it.' 8 7  Critics can point to attorneys engaging in
counsel").
182. See id. at 28-29 (noting the competition that would arise in the voucher system).
183. Cf id. at 28 (listing an objection to the voucher system as the defendant's lack of
information to choose an attorney).
184. See generally STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, AM. BAR
ASS'N, GIDEO'S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA'S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE v
(2004), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal-aid-
indigentdefendants/Is_sclaid_deLbprightto-counsel in_criminal-proceedings.authcheckdam.pdf
("Forty years after Gideon v. Wainwright, indigent defense in the United States remains in a state of
crisis, resulting in a system that lacks fundamental fairness and places poor persons at constant risk of
wrongful conviction.").
185. See id. at 7 (listing the various problems with the indigent defense system). The report
found:
Too often when attorneys are provided, crushing workloads make it impossible for them to
devote sufficient time to their cases, leading to widespread breaches of professional obligations.
To make matters worse, exceedingly modest compensation deters private attorneys from
performing more than the bare minimum required for payment. Further, the structure of
indigent[-]defense systems often means that judges and/or state and county officials control the
attorneys, thereby denying them the professional independence afforded to their prosecution
counterparts and to their colleagues retained by paying clients. Taken as whole, glaring
deficiencies in indigent[-]defense services result in a fundamentally unfair criminal[-]justice
system that constantly risks convicting persons who are genuinely innocent of the charges
lodged against them.
Id
186. Id. at 21 (proclaiming that ethical violations in indigent defense are prevalent, yet
overlooked).
187. Id. at 3 (portraying the "importance of providing adequate defense representation").
3972012]
ST. AIARYS]JOURNAL ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE &ETHics [Vol. 2:372
strikes, slowdowns, or litigation against their employers. 188 Are these
actions primarily motivated by concern for the welfare of the client or that
of the attorney? Do these actions create at least the appearance of a
conflict of interest for these attorneys? In the wheel arrangement, why do
judges appoint attorneys who are not next on the wheel or not even on the
wheel? Is it because of favoritism? Or, is it concern over the competence
or ethics of the next attorney on the wheel, and the judge knows of
someone better able to perform these functions? Even in the latter
situation, doesn't the judge's action nonetheless violate the ABA's concern
that "the appointment process should never be ad hoc?"' 8"
The appropriate approach requires an identification of the ethical
standards needed to analyze the interests of all concerned, including the
inherent conflicts of those interests.
A. Constitutional Dimensions
The United States Supreme Court has made quite clear that the right to
court-appointed counsel means that the defendant has a right to more than
just a warm body sitting at counsel table.o90 Counsel must fulfill the
obligation of loyalty to the client.191  The representation must be
188. See Lise Olse, Lawyers Strike Back in Clark County, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER REP.,
Apr. 28, 2003, http://www.seattlepi.com/news/article/Lawyers-strike-back-in-Clark-County-
11 13490.php (recognizing that indigent-defense providers instituted a strike to oppose low pay);




set%2522%2BAND%2B%2522to%2522%2BAND%2B%2522change%2522 (chastising and later
striking in opposition against an attorney who negotiated a plea for a client minutes after meeting
him); see also Kathleen Burge, Lawyers for Poor Feel Slap from US, BOSTON.COM NEWS, Oct. 17,
2003, http://www.boston.com/news/locallarticles/2003/10/17/lawyers-for-poor-feel-slapfrom-us/
(publicizing former Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney's $13 million reduction of funding to the
provider of indigent defense in the state, resulting in indigent-defense practitioners' refusal to accept
new cases). See generally Brandon Buskey, When Public Defenders Strike: Exploring How Public
Defenders Can Utilize the Lessons of Public Choice Theory to Become Effective Political Actors, 1 HARV.
L. & POL'Y REV. 533 (2007) (discussing the economic pressures of public defender offices that strike
or refuse to accept clients).
189. STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, AM. BAR AsS'N, TEN
PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM 2 (2002), available at http://www.american
bar.org/content/dam/abalmigrated/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/tenprinciplesbook
et.authcheckdam.pdf.
190. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984) ("That a person who happens to be
a lawyer is present at trial alongside the accused, however, is not enough to satisfy the constitutional
command.").
191. Id. at 688 ("Counsel's function is to assist the defendant, and hence counsel owes the
client a duty of loyalty, a duty to avoid conflicts of interest."); accord Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S.
398
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"zealous" and "active," not just "pro forma."' 9 2 Mere physical presence of
an attorney without active assistance in consulting, conferring, and
preparing a defense renders the appointment of that attorney nothing
more than a sham.1 9 3  The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals concluded
that "'[c]ompetent counsel' ought to require more than a human being
with a law license and a pulse." 194  Failure to meet these standards
constitutes a breach of the defendant's constitutional right to counsel.' 9 5
Despite these lofty pronouncements, courts routinely uphold convictions
under circumstances most lay persons would recognize as problematic,' 96
including a situation where an attorney slept during portions of the
trial. 197
B. American Bar Association Model Rules and Standards
The ABA recognizes the obligations of attorneys and judges in the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct.198 Pursuant to the Model Rules,
attorneys owe their clients the obligations of competence,' 9 9 diligence,200
communication, 2 0 ' confidentiality, 20 2 avoiding conflicts of interest, 203 as
335, 346 (1980) (denoting that defense counsel had an obligation to notify the court when a conflict
of interest arose).
192. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 58 (1932). But see id. at 75 (Bulter, J., dissenting)
(pointing to a "very rigorous and rigid cross-examination" as evidence that the defendant's
representation did not qualify as pro forma).
193. Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940); accord Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 89
(1923) (demonstrating an instance where counsel failed to consult the defendant, call witnesses, and
demand a change of venue, which resulted in a reversal of the order and a hearing in federal court).
194. Exparte Graves, 70 S.W.3d 103, 118 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
195. See generally Powell, 287 U.S. at 58 (emphasizing that a breach of the duty of loyalty on
behalf of the attorney resulted in the failure of the defendant to receive due process right of counsel).
196. See Johnson v. Norris, 207 F.3d 515, 518 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 886 (2000)
(portraying a situation where a bi-polar defense counsel lied to the client about trial experience and
lied on a malpractice insurance application, yet ineffective assistance was not found); Young v. Zant,
727 F.2d 1489, 1493 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1009 (1985) (holding that defense
counsel's drug use did not result in ineffective assistance); McFarland v. State, 928 S.W.2d 482, 505-
06 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (concluding that although defense counsel slept through portions of trial,
representation was not ineffective and defendant was not prejudiced), abrogated by Mosley v. State,
983 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
197. Paul J. Kelly, Jr., Are We Prepared to Offer Effective Assistance of Counsel?, 45 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 1089, 1093 (2001) ("In McFarland v. [State], when complaints were registered about a capital
defendant's lead counsel sleeping, the trial court reportedly responded, 'the Constitution guarantees
you a right of counsel, but does not say the lawyer has to be awake."' (quoting McFarland, 928
S.W.2d at 505)).
198. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (1983).
199. Id. R. 1.1 (2002).
200. Id. R. 1.3.
201. Id R. 1.4.
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well as other duties set out in the Model Rules. Judges must comply with
the law,204 avoid impropriety and the appearance thereof,2 05 maintain
impartiality,206 act without bias or prejudice, 2 0 7 and otherwise comply
with the Code of Judicial Conduct.2 0 8 Judges must not use their office to
advance personal interestS209 or allow external influences to affect their
judicial conduct. 2 1 0 The ABA specifically focused on the proper role that
attorneys, judges, and government funders should play in the
indigent-defense system by promulgating the ABA Ten Principles of a
Public Defense Delivery System. 2 1 1
C. Analyzing Attorney-Client-Government Payer Conflict
To some extent, there will always be some level of conflict or potential
conflict between every attorney and every client. While the attorney acts as
a fiduciary for clients, the attorney also has an interest in making a profit
202. Id. R. 1.6 (2003).
203. Id. R. 1.7, 1.8 (2002).
204. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2007).
205. Id. R. 1.2.
206. Id. R. 2.2.
207. Id. R. 2.3.
208. See generally MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2007).
209. Id. R. 1.3.
210. Id. R. 2.4.
211. STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, AM. BAR AsS'N, TEN
PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM 1 (2002), available at http://www.american
bar.org/content/dam/abalmigrated/legalservices/downloads/sclaidlindigentdefense/tenprinciplesbookl
et.authcheckdam.pdf. The ten "black letter" principles are:
1. The public defense function, including the selection, funding, and payment of defense
counsel, is independent.
2. Where the caseload is sufficiently high, the public defense delivery system consists of both
a defender office and the active participation of the private bar.
3. Clients are screened for eligibility, and defense counsel is assigned and notified of
appointment, as soon as feasible after clients' arrest, detention, or request for counsel.
4. Defense counsel is provided sufficient time and a confidential space within which to meet
with the client.
5. Defense counsel's workload is controlled to permit the rendering of quality
representation.
6. Defense counsel's ability, training, and experience match the complexity of the case.
7. The same attorney continuously represents the client until completion of the case.
8. There is parity between defense counsel and the prosecution with respect to resources and
defense counsel is included as an equal partner in the justice system.
9. Defense counsel is provided with and required to attend continuing legal education.
10. Defense counsel is supervised and systematically reviewed for quality and efficiency
according to nationally and locally adopted standards.
Id
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from the representation. 212 The preamble to the Model Rules explicitly
recognizes the existence of this conflict: "Virtually all difficult ethical
problems arise from conflict between a lawyer's responsibilities to clients,
to the legal system[,] and to the lawyer's own interest in remaining an
ethical person while earning a satisfactory living.'"
2 13
The indigent-defense context exacerbates this conflict because of the
third-party interest-namely, the government entity paying for the
defense. 214  The attorney wants to make a satisfactory living by
representing indigent defendants.215 The defendant does not desire
incarceration, would prefer acquittal, and does not have a particular
interest in the amount of money the government pays or the attorney
receives. The government wants to process and punish criminals as
inexpensively as possible and has no immediate concern for the attorney's
satisfactory living.2 16  However, all parties want to avoid conviction of
innocent defendants. The state wants to pay as little as possible, while
attorneys want to receive as much as possible. The defendant wants, and
should expect, zealous representation, regardless of the cost to the
government or to the attorney who might receive a reduced fee.
The Model Rules permit a third party-in this case the government-to
pay attorney's fees so long as the attorney does not allow the third party
"to direct or regulate the lawyer's professional judgment in rendering such
legal services." 2 17  The explicit purpose of this rule is to prevent
third-party payers from overriding the client's interests and "interfering
with the lawyer's professional judgment."2 1 8 Apart from the system of
indigent defense, this rule contemplates the scenario where a client selects
an attorney and the attorney sets a fee, then the client's benefactor pays the
fee to the attorney with the knowledge and approval of the informed
212. Id.
213. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 9 & scope (2002).
214. STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, AM. BAR Ass'N,
GIDEONS BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA'S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 2 (2004),
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abaladministrative/legaLaid indigent_
defendants/is sclaiddef.bp rightto_counsel in-criminal-proceedings.authcheckdam.pdf (citing
Robert L. Spangenberg & Marea L. Berman, Indigent Defense Systems in the United States, 58 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 31, 41 (1995)).
215. Id. at 3.
216. STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER & DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, CATO INST. POLICY ANALYSIS,
NO. 666, REFORMING INDIGENT DEFENSE: How FREE MARKET PRINCIPLES CAN HELP TO FIX A
BROKEN SYSTEM 3 (2010), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa666.pdf.
217. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4(c) (2002).
218. Id. R. 5. 4 (c) cmt. 1.
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client.219 However, in the context of indigent legal defense, the problem
proves more complicated than in the traditional third-party payer
arrangement. Indigents do not select their attorneys. Appointed attorneys
do not set their fees. Clients, and to some extent their attorneys, have little
voice in the rate of compensation set by the government. Clients rely on
the attorney to provide a zealous defense even if that attorney feels
undercompensated. 220 The client-defendant is clearly in the weakest
bargaining position of the three parties. After all, governments can
negotiate with attorneys over setting fee schedules. Attorneys generally
have the freedom not to participate in the indigent-defense system if they
feel the compensation is inadequate.221 Still, the client, including an
innocent client, must rely on the ethics and competence of the attorney
provided by the state.
In theory, the client should also rely on the judge to assist in this
three-way conflict because judges supposedly serve as guarantors of the
defendants' interests in the judicial process. However, judges face conflict
(particularly in an elected judiciary), experience criticism over clogged
dockets,2 " and receive negative attention if perceived as too soft on
crime. 223 All the while, judges receive pressure from multiple sources:
governmental entities pressure judges to reduce jail populations; attorneys
insist on receiving appointments from the judiciary; and judges feel
219. Id R. 5. 4 (c) cmt. 2.
220. STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, AM. BAR ASS'N, TEN
PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM 3 (2002), available at http://www.american
bar.org/content/dam/abalmigrated/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/tenprinciplesbook
et.authcheckdam.pdf.
221. ALLAN K. BUTCHER & MICHAEL K. MOORE, COMM. ON LEGAL SERVS. TO THE POOR
IN CRIMINAL MATTERS, STATE BAR OF TEx., MUTING GIDEONS TRUMPET: THE CRISIS OF
INDIGENT DEFENSE IN TEXAS 7 (2000), available at http://www.uta.edu/pols/moore/indigent/
last.doc.
222. See Kevin Krause, Judge May Block Court Planned to Clear Dallas County's Crowded Jails,
Dockets, DALL. MORNING-NEWS, May 12, 2010, http://www.dallasnews.com/news/community-
news/dallas/headlines/20100511-Judge-may-block-court-planned-to-9384.ece (examining a dispute
between some judges, the district attorney, and county commissioners); Amy L. Webb, Clogged Court
Dockets Cause Backup in jail, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Apr. 22, 2003, http://www2.indystar.com/
articles/5/037701-2515-P.html (discussing causes and effects of local clogged court dockets).
223. See Craig Kapitan, judge Cuts Offender in DWI Death a Break, SAN ANTONIO
EXPRESS-NEWS, Mar. 17, 2011, http://www.mysanantonio.com/news/local-news/article/Judge-cuts-
offender-in-DWI-death-a-break-1160474.php (noticing criticism directed towards a judge who
released an inmate "five months into [his] 10-year sentence"); Lori Fullbright, Plea Bargains For Tulsa
Killers: Is The Justice System Soft On Crime?, NEWS9 (Oct. 16, 2009, 4:27 PM),
http://www.news9.com/storyl 1324175/plea-bargains-for-tulsa-killers-is-the-justice-system-soft-on-c
rime?redirected=true (asking whether the recent imposition of "one year, four year[,] and 30 year[]"
sentences in three murder cases forecasts a justice system "too soft on crime").
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compelled to approve fee petitions that might overstate the attorney's
efforts in a particular case. In some instances, judges experience concerns
regarding the competence of some attorneys, yet the wheel system might
compel their appointment. In the worst scenario, judges might actively
participate in the process of appointing friends, who quickly plead
defendants, receive fees for their work, and then contribute to the judge's
campaign.
D. Economics Add to the Conflict
Governments increasingly face budget problems, and the criminal
justice system is expensive. The government must provide a police
force, afford jails, and fund an effective prosecutor's office.22 Some
individuals balk at the amount of money spent on criminal justice to
prosecute and defend those charged with crimes.2  Adding to the
problem is the reality that the government cannot completely predict how
much to budget for indigent defense.2  Crime rates and the prosecutor's
224. See ALLAN K. BUTCHER & MICHAEL K. MOORE, COMM. ON LEGAL SERVS. TO THE
POOR IN CRIMINAL MATTERS, STATE BAR OF TEX., MUTING GIDEONS TRUMPET: THE CRISIS OF
INDIGENT CRIMINAL DEFENSE IN TExAS 12 (2000), available at http://www.uta.edu/pols/
moorelindigentilast.doc (reporting the results of a 1995 survey of 494 Texas judges who presided
over criminal jurisdictions). The survey reported that 39.5% of judges believed their peers made
appointments based on personal friendship with the appointed attorney; 35.1% of judges admitted to
considering attorney appointment based on the attorney's political support; and 30.3% admitted
taking attorney's campaign contributions into account during the appointment process. Id. A Harris
County defense attorney stated "I have been refused appointments because I cannot afford to give
money to the judge's reelection campaign ... those attorneys who contribute the most money receive
the most work." Id.
225. Employnent and Expenditure, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.
cfm?ty=tp&tid=5 (last visited Mar. 1, 2012) ("In fiscal year 2007, federal, state, and local
governments spent an estimated $228 billion for police protection, corrections, and judicial and legal
services.... Federal, state, and local governments spent about $50 billion for judicial and legal
services nationwide.").
226. See ALLAN K. BUTCHER & MICHAEL K. MOORE, COMM. ON LEGAL SERVS. TO THE
POOR IN CRIMINAL MATTERS, STATE BAR OF TEX., MUTING GIDEONS TRUMPET: THE CRISIS OF
INDIGENT CRIMINAL DEFENSE IN TExAS 3-5 (2000), available at http://www.uta.edulpols/
moore/indigent/last.doc (providing a history of the rights of indigent defendants to have an attorney
appointed to represent them in light of the Supreme Court's holding in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963)).
227. See BELDEN RUSSONELLO & STEWART, OPEN SOC'Y INST. & NAT'L LEGAL AID &
DEFENDER Ass'N, DEVELOPING A NATIONAL MESSAGE FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE: ANALYSIS OF
NATIONAL SURVEY 37-38 (2001), available at http://www.nlada.org/DMS/Documents/
1211996548.53/Polling%20results%20report.pdf (discussing the hesitation to increase government
spending for indigent defense).
228. See BEXAR CNTY. TASK FORCE ON INDIGENT DEF., FINAL REPORT 2 (2011), available
at http://www.bexar.org/Indigent/FinalReport20 11.pdf (describing the unexplained, disproportional
increase in the cost of indigent defense).
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charging discretion rest beyond the control of funders.2
Some obvious economic issues present themselves. If appointed
attorneys are underpaid to represent indigents, quality attorneys will stay
away from the indigent-defense system due to the economic incentives of
private representation.2 3 0 Additionally, unethical attorneys who
participate face the temptation to inflate bills.2 3 1 On the other hand, if
court-appointed attorneys are overpaid, an incentive may exist for
attorneys to drag out criminal cases by filing numerous, unnecessary
motions and declining legitimate pleas in favor of taking cases to trial. 2
Some suggest that the solution to these difficulties and conflicts lies in
free-market incentives.2  Others call for legislative2  and litigation2
strategies to reform the system. Almost everyone agrees the system is
"broken." 2 3 1 Many are now struggling in an effort to fix these
difficulties.23 However, no amount of tinkering with the system,
mechanism, and structures will succeed unless lawyers and judges recognize
229. See id. (displaying the increased levels of criminal prosecution, along with elevated defense
expenses, between 2004 and 2010).
230. STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, AM. BAR AsS'N,
GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA'S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 7-9 (2004),
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrativelegal aid indigent
defendants/Is sclaid def bp-right-tocounselincriminal-proceedings.authcheckdam.pdf
(describing the difficulty in recruiting and training attorneys for indigent defense without offering
comparable compensation).
231. Remark by a San Antonio attorney admitting to bill-padding in response to low pay at an
open public hearing of the Bexar County Task Force on Indigent Defense, chaired by this author, in
San Antonio, Texas, January-May, 2011.
232. See STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER & DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, CATO INST. POLICY ANALYSIS,
No. 666, REFORMING INDIGENT DEFENSE: HOW FREE MARKET PRINCIPLES CAN HELP TO FIX A
BROKEN SYSTEM 4 (2010), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa666.pdf (explaining the
consequences of paying court-appointed attorneys excessive hourly fees).
233. See id. (proposing a free-market alternative to indigent-defense services).
234. See CARA H. DRINAN, AM. CONSTITUTION SOC'Y FOR LAW & POLICY, A LEGISLATIVE
APPROACH TO INDIGENT DEFENSE REFORM 5-7 (2010), available at http://www.acslaw.org/
sites/default/files/ACS Issue Brief Drinan Indigent Def Reform_0.pdf (proposing federal legislation
to clarify the state burden of providing indigent defense along with remedies available for violations
of a defendant's right to counsel).
235. See EVE BRENSIKE PRIMUS, AM. CONSTITUTION SOC'Y FOR LAW & POLICY,
LITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR DEALING WITH THE INDIGENT DEFENSE CRISIS 5 (2010), available
at http://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Primus - Litigation Strategies.pdf (suggesting court
review of inadequate counsel to indigent defendants).
236. See, e.g., id. at 1 (characterizing the current indigent-defense structure as being in "a state
of crisis").
237. See generally BEXAR CNTY. TASK FORCE ON INDIGENT DEF., FINAL REPORT (2011),
available at http://www.bexar.org/Indigent/FinalReport2011 .pdf (proposing several improvements to
Bexar County's method of indigent defense, none of which have been implemented although support
for improvement exists).
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that the problem is not just one of economics, but also one of ethics.
V. RECONSTRUCTING A MODEL SYSTEM
Forty years after Gideon, how would one best reconstruct an
indigent-defense system that will function ethically, effectively, and
efficiently? Before attempting to move attorneys, clients, and resources
into new configurations, one should stop for a moment to consider the
purpose of reconstructing a broken system. The inevitable conflicts,
previously identified in this Article, must be confronted in order to
determine how to balance the competing and conflicting concerns. A
suggested approach is provided below.
A. Recommit Our Profession to the Goal of Service
The legal profession enjoys a monopoly on the practice of law. Indeed,
it is a crime for a nonlawyer to engage in law practice.2 38  Lawyers carry
substantial public responsibility, given that the legal profession intends to
remain a self-regulating profession. Since the profession shuns nonlawyers
from the practice and its regulation, attorneys must recommit themselves
to the notion that the practice of law is a service profession. The service
component of the profession does not negate the fact that attorneys may
still receive a "satisfactory living" 239 from their employment, but the focus
must consist of more than simply the attorney's well-being.2 40  It is easy
to recall noble examples of attorneys who, at great personal sacrifice,
vigorously represented the interests of unpopular clients. John Adams
defended the British soldiers charged with murdering American patriots at
238. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.123 (West 2011) (articulating the components of
unauthorized practice of law); accord MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4(b) (2002) ("A
lawyer shall not form a partnership with a nonlawyer if any of the activities of the partnership consist
of the practice of law."). Rule 5.4(d) further states:
A lawyer shall not practice with or in the form of a professional corporation or association
authorized to practice law for a profit, if:
(1) a nonlawyer owns any interest therein, except that a fiduciary representative of the
estate of a lawyer may hold the stock or interest of the lawyer for a reasonable time during
administration;
(2) a nonlawyer is a corporate director or officer thereof or occupies the position of similar
responsibility in any form of association other than a corporation; or
(3) a nonlawyer has the right to direct or control the professional judgment of a lawyer.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4(d) (2002).
239. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 9 & scope (2002) (suggesting that
lawyers are entitled to a reasonable wage while remaining ethical).
240. See id. (suggesting that lawyers are entitled to a reasonable wage while remaining ethical).
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the outbreak of the Revolutionary War.24 1 Even in fictional accounts,
such as To Kill a Mockingbird,2 42 the nobility of the lawyer's sacrifice in
the name of service to the client and the public serves as an inspiration.
The recommitment to the notion of service emphasizes a need to refocus
on the client and societal interests, which will ultimately benefit the
profession.24 Attorneys should be held in higher esteem than is reflected
by society's current view, and this can be done by serving the community.
Attorneys are committed, in theory, to the concept of pro bono
assistance. This theory can and should be better implemented in the
indigent-defense system.
Specifically, attorneys in private practice must be willing to represent
indigent clients competently and zealously, even if they are not paid the
same rate that private clients would pay.24 This is nothing new; in some
instances attorneys have been willing to work in this capacity for free.2 4
The San Antonio plan, for example, required all local attorneys to sign up
for appointments at no charge or pay an annual fee if they chose to opt
out.247
241. L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel, The Boston Massacre Trials, 55 A.B.A. J. 329, 329-33
(1969) (requoting John Adam's letter to his father, which stated that the soldiers "charged with
murder, are not yet legally proved guilty, and therefore, however criminal, are entitled, by the laws of
God and man, to all legal counsel and aid").
242. See generally HARPER LEE, TO KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (1960) (advancing Atticus Finch as
a court-appointed attorney representing a black man falsely accused of rape in the fictional novel set
in the 1950s).
243. See STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, AM. BAR ASS'N,
GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA'S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 1 (2004),
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abaladministrativellegal-aid-indigent-
defendants/Is sclaid def bprighttocounsel-incriminal.proceedings.authcheckdam.pdf
(declaring that the indigent-defense system is inadequately funded and sourced, resulting in the
denial of proper legal representation for the indigent population).
244. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.1 (2002) (encouraging attorneys to devote
a minimum of fifty hours per year to pro bono service).
245. See STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, AM. BAR ASS'N,
GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA'S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 9 (2004),
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abaladministrative/legal_aid indigent_
defendants/is_sclaidIdef bp-right-to-counsel-in_criminal-proceedings.authcheckdam.pdf
(acknowledging the low wages paid toward indigent representation).
246. See generally ALLAN K. BUTCHER & MICHAEL K. MOORE, COMM. ON LEGAL SERVS. TO
THE POOR IN CRIMINAL MATTERS, STATE BAR OF TEX., MUTING GIDEON'S TRUMPET: THE
CRISIS OF INDIGENT CRIMINAL DEFENSE IN TExAS (2000), available at http://www.uta.edulpols/
moore/indigenr/last.doc (noting the practice of counties that appointed attorneys but did not
compensate for their legal services).
247. ALLAN K. BUTCHER & MICHAEL K. MOORE, COMM. ON LEGAL SERVS. TO THE POOR
IN CRIMINAL MATTERS, STATE BAR OF TEX., MUTING GIDEON'S TRUMPET: THE CRISIS OF
INDIGENT CRIMINAL DEFENSE IN TExAS 6 n.8 (2000), available at http://www.uta.edu/pols/moore/
indigent/last.doc (observing that attorneys in Bexar and El Paso Counties could pay a fee to "buy
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Attorneys seeking positions as public defenders should do so with the
understanding that they may not be paid as well as the private attorneys or
prosecutors whom they face in court. 24 8  Instead, time spent in the public
defender office should be viewed as an opportunity to serve and to gain
experience that will ultimately open new doors.2 4 9  Those who then leave
the public defender office will be better able to train and mentor new
public defenders or private counsel.2 50 Experienced attorneys in private
practice must be willing to participate, as both client advocates and as
trainers and mentors for less experienced counsel. 2 5 1
Judges must be willing to appoint counsel when necessary, rather than
attempting to save government expense by avoiding appointment of
indigent-defense counsel.2 2 Judges have to scrupulously avoid even the
appearance of favoritism or kickbacks in operating an indigent-defense
system of private appointments.25 Indeed, as a group, judges should join
with attorneys to advocate for "[r]emoving oversight from the judiciary"
and placing that oversight in the hands of a nonpartisan board, as
out" and keep their names off the indigent-defense wheel list). Oral history was provided to this
Article's author in January 2011 by Tom Stolhandske, member of the Bexar County Task Force on
Indigent Defense; Hon. Larry Noll, Judge, Bexar County 408th District Court; Jimmy Allison,
Executive Director, San Antonio Bar Association; and others.
248. See STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, AM. BAR ASS'N,
TEN PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM 3 (2002), available at http://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/abalmigrated/legalservices/downloads/sclaidlindigentdefense/tenprinci
plesbooklet.authcheckdam.pdf (recommending parity in "workloads, salaries, and other resources"
between the indigent's counsel and the prosecutor).
249. See id. at 17 (describing the voluminous case load in indigent representation).
250. See AM. COUNCIL OF CHIEF DEFENDERS BEST PRACTICES COMM., NAT'L LEGAL AID
& DEFENDERS ASS'N, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ABA'S TEN PRINCIPLES IN ASSIGNED-COUNSEL
SYSTEMS 10-12 (2010), available at http://www.nlada.org/DMS/Documents/1285271312.2/
NLADA%20best%20prac%209-12- 1 Omt%20final.pdf (articulating several mentorship and training
programs adopted across the nation).
251. See AM. COUNCIL OF CHIEF DEFENDERS BEST PRACTICES COMM., NAT'L LEGAL AID
& DEFENDERS ASS'N, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ABA's TEN PRINCIPLES IN ASSIGNED-COUNSEL
SYSTEMS 12 (2010), available at http://www.nlada.org/DMS/Documents/1285271312.2/
NLADA%20best%20prac%209-12-1 Omt%20final.pdf (discussing the mentoring programs in place
in various counties across the country whereby experienced attorneys mentor new attorneys).
252. See STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, AM. BAR ASS'N,
GIDEOAS BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA'S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 25 (2004),
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal-aid indigent
defendants/Is sclaid def bp-right to_counselin.criminal-proceedings.authcheckdam.pdf (noting
instances when judges permitted indigent and illiterate defendants to sign complex forms that waive
the defendant's constitutional right to counsel and serve as a plea of guilty).
253. See BEXAR CNTY. TASK FORCE ON INDIGENT DEF., FINAL REPORT 10-11 (2011),
available at http://www.bexar.org/Indigent/FinalReport2011 .pdf (requiring judges to justify
appointing an attorney "off the wheel" given the implication of impropriety).
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recommended by the ABA. 254  Judges should join with attorneys in a
public education function. 2 5 5  They should inform the governing bodies
and the public at large of the importance of maintaining an ethical,
effective, and efficient system by helping everyone understand the ongoing
conflicts and dilemmas associated with the system.
B. Think Locally
Some very strong arguments have been made for national standards in
indigent defense, either through legislation 2 5 7  or judicial
determination?.25  However, a "one-size-fits-all" approach is not practical
since states vary in demographics, population density, and other relevant
factors.2 5 9  A public-defender system might work well in a highly
populated metropolitan area but experience difficulties in a less populated
district in the United States. Moreover, a national system would
undermine the local bar participation, which is critical to the ultimate
success of indigent-defense systems as argued under this subsection and the
next.260
254. STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, AM. BAR ASS'N, TEN
PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM 2 (2002), available at http://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/legalservices/downloads/sclaidlindigentdefense/tenprinci
plesbooklet.authcheckdam.pdf (suggesting that an independent board should replace the judiciary in
overseeing the indigent-defense programs).
255. See AM. COUNCIL OF CHIEF DEFENDERS BEST PRACTICES COMM., NAT'L LEGAL AID
& DEFENDERS ASS'N, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ABA's TEN PRINCIPLES IN ASSIGNED-COUNSEL
SYSTEMS 12 (2010), available at http://www.nlada.org/DMS/Documents/1285271312.2/
NLADA%20best%20prac%209-12-10mt%20final.pdf (noting that judges may provide informal
feedback for indigent representatives).
256. See generally ALLAN K. BUTCHER & MICHAEL K. MOORE, COMM. ON LEGAL SERVS. TO
THE POOR IN CRIMINAL MATTERS, STATE BAR OF TEX., MUTING GIDEONMS TRUMPET: THE
CRISIS OF INDIGENT CRIMINAL DEFENSE IN TEXAS (2000), available at http://www.uta.edu/pols/
moore/indigen/last.doc (calling for a movement to reform the existing dysfunctional policies in
Texas).
257. See CARA H. DRINAN, AM. CONSTITUTION. SOC'Y FOR LAW & POLICY, A LEGISLATIVE
APPROACH TO INDIGENT DEFENSE REFORM 5-7 (2010), available at http://www.acslaw.org/
sites/default/files/ACS Issue Brief Drinan Indigent Def Reform_0.pdf (proposing specific text and
criteria necessary for a legislative solution).
258. See EVE BRENSIKE PRIMUS, AM. CONSTITUTION SOC'Y FOR LAW & POLICY,
LITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR DEALING WITH THE INDIGENT DEFENSE CRISIS 5 (2010), available
at http://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Primus-- Litigation Strategies.pdf (advocating federal
judicial review of a state's alleged denial of counsel to indigent defendants).
259. See TEX. TASK FORCE ON INDIGENT DEF. & THE SPANGENBERG GRP., BLUEPRINT
FOR CREATING A PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICE IN TEXAS 25-43 (2d ed. 2008), available at
http://www.courts.state.tx.us/tidc/pdf/2008revisedblueprintfinal.pdf (detailing examples of differing
populations and caseloads within Texas and in other jurisdictions).
260. See Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A National
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The control and structure of indigent defense should be at the local
level, operating under a constitutionally mandated framework, which
would work similar to the educational approach in this country.2 61  For
example, the Constitution guarantees that schools will not operate in a
segregated fashion, yet local boards are left with the discretion to create
and operate their own public education systems. 2 2 Local control means
local responsibility, which means greater public participation.
C. Roll the Wheel to the Bar Associations
Bar associations are currently responsible for disciplinary oversight. 1 6
Local bar association members know each other, work together on a
multitude of projects, and thus should be intimately involved with the
indigent-defense system.26 5 The "active participation of the private bar" is
recognized by the ABA as one of the principles of an effective defense
system. 26
How could this participation be guaranteed? Every system, including
public-defender systems, requires some involvement of private
attorneyS267 and increased participation should be sought.2 6 1
Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1129 (2006) (suggesting local and state bars effectively monitor the
defense system and establish workable standards tailored to the community).
261. See TEX. TASK FORCE ON INDIGENT DEF. & THE SPANGENBERG GRP., BLUEPRINT
FOR CREATING A PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICE IN TEXAS 41-43 (2d ed. 2008), available at
http://www.courts.state.tx.us/tidc/pdf/2008revisedblueprintfinal.pdf (indicating the historical
responsibility of local counties for supporting indigent representation).
262. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that segregated schools are
unconstitutional and remanding for argument regarding implementation).
263. See Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A National
Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1129 (2006) (advocating for local bar participation and monitoring
of the indigent system).
264. See, e.g., TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 81.071 (West 2005) (establishing the State Bar of
Texas and a "chief disciplinary counsel" responsible for disciplining violations under the rules of
conduct).
265. See, e.g., Victor H. Negron, Jr., SABA: YOUR Bar Association, SAN ANTONIO B. ASS'N
(Oct. 5, 2011, 12:14 PM), http://www.sanantoniobar.org/displaycommon.cfm?an=1 &sub
articlenbr=71 (providing an example of a local bar association's goal for furthering its community's
objectives).
266. STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, AM. BAR ASS'N, TEN
PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM 2 (2002), available at http://www.american
bar.org/content/dam/abalmigrated/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/tenprinciplesbook
et.authcheckdam.pdf.
267. See, e.g, Jewell v. Maynard, 383 S.E.2d 536, 539 (W. Va. 1989) (relaying that "most
judicial circuits still rely on the appointment of private practitioners for indigent defense work").
268. See STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, AM. BAR ASS'N,
TEN PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM 2 (2002), available at http://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/abamigrated/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/tenprinci
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Transferring supervision of indigent-defense systems from the judiciary to
the local bar association "ensures judicial independence from undue
political pressures and is an important means of furthering the
independence of public defense." 269  Oversight by the bar association
would force attorneys not typically associated with indigent criminal
defense to become involved. 270 Attorneys would buy into the system and
could no longer ignore issues by assuming that these matters are being
handled by others.2 7 1
D. Look West. . . to San Mateo
No one program will work in every jurisdiction. Areas with
well-established, well-functioning public defender offices need not make
sudden changes but should consider the need for private attorney
participation due to conflicts, overloads, and other similar issues. 27 In
areas without a well-functioning public-defender system, where the county
must either supplement its public-defender system or utilize a wheel or
private attorney contracts, the San Mateo County PDP provides clear
benefits of guaranteed bar oversight .2 7  The San Mateo County PDP
establishes collaboration between the independent oversight of the local
bar association and the needs of San Mateo County. 274  The San Mateo
County Bar Association's website describes the history and an overview of
the system, stating:
Frustration with the problems of the direct appointment system led the
Board of Supervisors of San Mateo County to seriously consider the
establishment of a Public Defender Office in the course of preparing its
1967-[19]68 budget. The initial proposal for such an office by the [c]ounty
administrative staff was highly unrealistic in terms of staffing, and the San
Mateo County Bar Association strongly voiced its criticism. The Bar
Association felt that there were many good aspects to the direct appointment
system, but recognized the validity of certain complaints, such as the cost
plesbooklet.authcheckdam.pdf (advancing participation of attorneys and the local bar association).
269. See id. (advocating for an independent board to oversee the structure and implementation
of indigent defense).
270. See id. (encouraging active participation by bar members).
271. See id. (recommending participation across public and private efforts).
272. See id. (suggesting the active participation of private bar associations and establishing
independent oversight).
273. See Private Defender Program, SAN MATEO CNTY. B. ASS'N, https://www.smcba.org/For
the Public/PrivateDefenderProgram.aspx (last visited Mar. 1, 2012) (demonstrating the cooperation
between the county and the bar association).
274. See id. (discussing the indigent-defense contract between the bar association and the
county).
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control problem, and the absence of a system for matching the attorney's
skill and experience to the seriousness of a given case. The Bar Association
appointed a select committee to examine the alternatives. The committee
developed the idea of the Bar Association assuming the responsibility of
providing attorneys for indigent defendants, and administering the entire
program. The plan called for a contract with the [c]ounty, incorporating
cost and quality controls, with the courts determining the eligibility of
defendants for appointed counsel. In December 1968, the County of San
Mateo, and the San Mateo County Bar Association entered into such
contract, and the Private Defender Program ("PDP") was born.2 7 5
The San Mateo plan has worked well for over forty years. 2 7 6  The
bench, the bar, the prosecutor's office, and the county government all
support the program.2" There is a noticeable feeling of professionalism
associated with the program, and it operates without the friction that
characterizes other systems.2 78  The program's training manuals, fee
schedules, and other materials are readily available and could be easily
tailored to the circumstances of other jurisdictions.2 7 9  A board of
directors names the chief defender, who implements a weighted method
for determining caseload distribution, as well as other administrative
tasks. 2 8 0  The board is elected by the members of the bar, thereby
eliminating the likelihood of dissatisfaction, strikes, or lawsuits by
participating attorneys.2 8 1
Unlike other systems, the San Mateo Private Defender Program is not
broken. It is the model for an effective, ethical, and efficient
indigent-defense system and should be duplicated wherever possible.2
Rather than offering full-time employment to some but denying court
275. Id.
276. PRIVATE DEFENDER PROGRAM, SAN MATEO CNTY. BAR ASS'N, ANNUAL REPORT:
FISCAL YEAR 2009-2010 TO THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS 6 (2010).
277. See Private Defender Program, SAN MATEO CNTY. B. ASS'N, https://www.smcba.org/For
the Public/PrivateDefenderProgram.aspx (last visited Mar. 1, 2012) (discussing the cooperation
amongst the parties).
278. PRIVATE DEFENDER PROGRAM, SAN MATEO CNTY. BAR ASS'N, ANNUAL REPORT:
FISCAL YEAR 2009-2010 TO THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS 42 (2010).
279. See Private Defender Program, SAN MATEO CNTY. B. ASS'N, https://www.smcba.org/For
the Public/PrivateDefenderProgram.aspx (last visited Mar. 1, 2012) (explaining the basic agreement
between the bar association and the county).
280. See id. (describing the responsibilities of the chief defender).
281. See id. (discussing the relationship between the Bar Association Board of Directors and the
chief defender's position).
282. See Description ofService Programs, SAN MATEO CNTY. B. ASS'N, https://www.smcba.org/
For the Public/CommunityServicePrograms.aspx (last visited Mar. 1, 2012) (referencing national
acclaim for the system due to the high quality representation of indigent clients).
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appointments to many more, the PDP allows more attorneys to be
involved in indigent defense than under a traditional public-defender
system.28 The involvement of the local bar deflects any potential
opposition by the bar when a county considers establishing its own
public-defender system.2 M
E. Create Incentives for Attorney Participation
One of the most important components in encouraging participation
and support for indigent-defense programs is to provide attorneys with
sufficient compensation. 28 However, attorneys should not expect those
in the public service role of defending indigents to be compensated at the
same rate as those in private practice. 28" They should understand that
other attorney participants in the criminal-justice system, namely judges
and prosecutors, are also not commanding the salaries that private
practitioners with comparable experience receive in the practice of law.2 8 7
They should be sensitive to the budgetary realities with which governments
are struggling.28 8  Unrealistic compensation demands could create a
backlash, adding to the public perception of attorneys as greedy individuals
only concerned with their own well-being. 28 9 So how can those interested
in creating effective indigent-defense systems help create incentives that
283. See Private Defender Program, SAN MATEO CNTY. B. ASS'N, https://www.smcba.org/For
the Public/PrivateDefenderProgram.aspx (last visited Mar. 1, 2012) (commenting on the program's
growth in both case load and budget since the time of its inception).
284. See id. (referring to the original opposition to the county's efforts in starting its own public
defender's office).
285. See STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, AM. BAR ASS'N,
GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA'S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 9 (2004),
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abaladministrativellegal-aid-indigent_
defendants/Is sclaid-def bp-right-tocounselincriminal.proceedings.authcheckdam.pdf (noting
the need to adequately compensate attorneys for indigent representation).
286. See id. (recognizing the disparity between adequate compensation and current
compensation for indigent defense).
287. See, e.g., United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, 635 (9th Cir. 1965) (reiterating that the
lower wage paid to court-appointed attorneys "falls within the realm of humanities rather than
commerce").
288. See STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, AM. BAR ASS'N,
GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA'S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 8 (2004),
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legaliaidindigent-
defendants/Is sclaid def bprightto-counsel-incriminal.proceedings.authcheckdam.pdf
(explaining the funding disparities between regions).
289. See STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER & DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, CATO INST. POLICY ANALYSIS,
NO. 666, REFORMING INDIGENT DEFENSE: HOW FREE MARKET PRINCIPLES CAN HELP TO FIX A
BROKEN SYSTEM 11 (2010), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa666.pdf (indicating the
wealth amassed by some appointed attorneys who had minimal contact with their indigent client).
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will make attorney participation more attractive?
A first step would be to examine the fee schedules in the San Mateo
plan, then to make adjustments based on the economic situation of the
particular state or county. The bar should be involved in the process, so
that attorneys would enter the program with a feeling that the
compensation, although not enriching, was nonetheless satisfactory.2 9 0
Another step would be to seek development of loan forgiveness programs
for attorneys in public service, which are available through many law
schools. 2 9 ' Furthermore, private donors might be willing to contribute to
such a program. The creation of individual development accounts, which
would pay for additional travel, continuing education, and maybe even the
equivalent of sabbaticals for practitioners with a specified amount of time
in the program, should be explored. Local governments could consider
allowing attorneys to participate in health care and other benefits already
offered to prosecutors. 2 92
Noneconomic incentives could also be created.2 9 3  Bar associations
could recognize and publicize the efforts and sacrifices of the participating
attorneys. 2 9 ' Law firms might recruit attorneys from those who have
served in the indigent-defense program.29 After all, these attorneys
would have obtained intense client contact, negotiation, and trial
experience skills useful in civil law practices.
290. See Private Defender Program, SAN MATEO CNTY. B. ASS'N, https://www.smcba.org/For
the PubliclPrivateDefenderProgram.aspx (last visited Mar. 1, 2012) (outlining the flexible attorney
fee structure in San Mateo County).
291. See STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, AM. BAR ASS'N,
GIDEOAYS BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA'S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 14 n.114
(2004), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abaladministrative/legal aid indigent
defendants/s_sdaiddeLbpright tocounselin_criminal-proceedings.authcheckdam.pdf
(discussing the fact that public defenders do not receive loan forgiveness while their counterparts in
prosecution do).
292. See id. at 13-14 (pointing out the disparities between resources available to prosecutors
versus public defenders).
293. See STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER & DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, CATO INST. POLICY ANALYSIS,
No. 666, REFORMING INDIGENT DEFENSE: How FREE MARKET PRINCIPLES CAN HELP TO FIX A
BROKEN SYSTEM 11 (2010), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa666.pdf (focusing on
non-economic incentives such as "personal pride, professional ethics, and idealistic commitment to
helping the accused").
294. Cf LEGAL SERVS. OF N. FLA., PRIVATE ATTORNEY INVOLVEMENT PLAN 2011 5-6
(2011), available at http://lsnf.org/plan2011.pdf (recognizing pro bono service in indigent
representation through the Private Attorney Involvement Program).
295. See STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER & DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, CATO INST. POLICY ANALYSIS,
NO. 666, REFORMING INDIGENT DEFENSE: HOW FREE MARKET PRINCIPLES CAN HELP TO FIX A
BROKEN SYSTEM 11 (2010), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa666.pdf (advancing the
need for more than mere idealism to incentivize attorneys in representing an indigent client).
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Incentives must be created for government improvements to the
system.2 9 6 Bar associations should seek to determine whether grants, such
as those available in Texas,297 could be used to improve the local
system. 298  Bar leaders and local law schools should explore whether
partnerships with the clinical programs of those schools could bring
resources, including the participation of law students and faculty members
into the system.299 Criminal defense firms must be willing to mentor and
supervise new attorneys. oo Finally, bar associations can utilize the
resources and suggestions available in developing improved programs and
urge their adoption.3 0 1
296. See generally TEX. INDIGENT DEFENSE COMM'N, FY 2012 FORMULA GRANT PROGRAM
(2011), available at http://www.txcourts.gov/tidc/pdflFY2012FormulaGrantRFA.pdf (allowing
eligible counties to receive grants in order to promote compliance with indigent-defense standards
promulgated by the commission).
297. See generally Grant Program, TEX. INDIGENT DEF. COMMISSION, http://www.txcourts.
gov/tfid/TFIDGrant_- Program.asp (last visited Feb. 28, 2012) (offering three formula grants and
four discretionary grants).
298. See id. (explaining the programs and grants, as well as providing descriptions of each
funding stream).
299. LEGAL SERVS. OF N. FLA., PRIVATE ATTORNEY INVOLVEMENT PLAN 2011 5 (2011),
available at http://1snf.org/plan20l 1.pdf (proposing an outreach program involving law students in
indigent defense). This Article's author, as vice president of the Mexican American Law Student
Association at the University of New Mexico School of Law, assisted in the creation of a partnership
between the New Mexico Public Defender's Office and the University of New Mexico School of Law
in the 1970s. "Centrolegal" provided indigent defense to those charged with misdemeanors in
Albuquerque. This Article's author served as a supervising attorney in the program after graduation
in 1975.
300. See AM. COUNCIL OF CHIEF DEFENDERS BEST PRACTICES COMM., NAT'L LEGAL AID
& DEFENDERS ASS'N, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ABA'S TEN PRINCIPLES IN ASSIGNED-COUNSEL
SYSTEMS 12 (2010), available at http://www.nlada.org/DMS/Documents/1285271312.2/
NLADA%20best%20prac%209-12-10mt%20final.pdf (describing the various mentoring programs
that supply formal and informal performance reviews of attorneys representing indigent clients).
301. See RICHARD J. WILSON, INDIGENT DEFENSE RESOURCES: AN ANNOTATED
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF MATERIALS ON INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMS, INCLUDING A STATE-BY-STATE
LISTING OF REPORTS AND STUDIES, available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abal
migrated/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/20110325_aba -indigentdefenseresourcesbib
liog.authcheckdam.pdf (examining the various public-defender assistance programs, organized by
state, conducted through the Bar Information Program); Indigent Defense/Public Defender Systems:
ABA Policies & Guidelines on Indigent Defense, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal-aid-
indigentdefendants/initiatives/indigent-defense-systems -improvement/policies-guidelines.htmi
(last visited Mar. 1, 2012) (providing a complete list of adopted indigent-defense policies from 1973
to the present); see also AM. COUNCIL OF CHIEF DEFENDERS BEST PRACTICES COMM., NAT'L
LEGAL AID & DEFENDERS ASS'N, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ABA'S TEN PRINCIPLES IN
ASSIGNED-COUNSEL SYSTEMS 12 (2010), available at http://www.nlada.org/DMS/Documents/
1285271312.2/NLADA%20best%20prac%209-12-10mt%20final.pdf (analyzing existing indigent-
defense systems under the ABA's Ten Principles for best practices). The Texas Task Force on
Indigent Defense, along with the Spangenberg Group, recommend that the following steps be taken
when creating a public-defender program:
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VI. CONCLUSION
We cannot allow an important part of our legal system to remain
broken any longer. Constructing new, ethical, efficient, and effective
indigent-defense systems will benefit individual defendants, our system of
justice, the attorneys who participate, and our profession as a whole.
(1) convening stakeholders to discuss options, methods and impact; (2) decide what categories
of cases the public defender will be assigned; (3) write a Request for Proposals (examples
abound); (4) evaluate RFP responses and select a governmental or non-profit organization to
operate the public defender; (5) negotiate a contract or establish a budget; (6) hire or approve
the chief public defender; and (7) modify procedures to transition from the existing system to
the public defender.
TEx. TASK FORCE ON INDIGENT DEF. & THE SPANGENBERG GRP., BLUEPRINT FOR CREATING
A PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICE IN TEXAS 41-43 (2d ed. 2008), available at http://www.courts.
state.tx.us/tidc/pdfl2008revisedblueprintfinal.pdf; see Policies and Standards, TEX. INDIGENT DEF.
COMMISSION, http://www.txcourts.gov/tidc/TFID-policies-and_ standards.htm (last visited Mar.
1, 2012) (listing sample indigent-defense plans and templates).
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